$Prooφ$: A ZKP Market Mechanism
Fuente:
arXiv
Guardado en:
| Autores principales: | Wang, Wenhao, Zhou, Lulu, Yaish, Aviv, Zhang, Fan, Fisch, Ben, Livshits, Benjamin |
|---|---|
| Formato: | Preprint |
| Publicado: |
2024
|
| Materias: | |
| Acceso en línea: | |
| Etiquetas: |
Agregar Etiqueta
Sin Etiquetas, Sea el primero en etiquetar este registro!
|
Ejemplares similares
TierDrop: Harnessing Airdrop Farmers for User Growth
por: Yaish, Aviv, et al.
Publicado: (2024)
por: Yaish, Aviv, et al.
Publicado: (2024)
Discrete & Bayesian Transaction Fee Mechanisms
por: Gafni, Yotam, et al.
Publicado: (2022)
por: Gafni, Yotam, et al.
Publicado: (2022)
Barriers to Collusion-resistant Transaction Fee Mechanisms
por: Gafni, Yotam, et al.
Publicado: (2024)
por: Gafni, Yotam, et al.
Publicado: (2024)
Perils of Parallelism: Transaction Fee Mechanisms under Execution Uncertainty
por: Wadhwa, Sarisht, et al.
Publicado: (2026)
por: Wadhwa, Sarisht, et al.
Publicado: (2026)
Your Loss is My Gain: Low Stake Attacks on Liquid Staking Pools
por: Yang, Sen, et al.
Publicado: (2026)
por: Yang, Sen, et al.
Publicado: (2026)
Scheduling With Time Discounts
por: Gafni, Yotam, et al.
Publicado: (2024)
por: Gafni, Yotam, et al.
Publicado: (2024)
Strategic Vote Timing in Online Elections With Public Tallies
por: Yaish, Aviv, et al.
Publicado: (2024)
por: Yaish, Aviv, et al.
Publicado: (2024)
Inequality in the Age of Pseudonymity
por: Yaish, Aviv, et al.
Publicado: (2025)
por: Yaish, Aviv, et al.
Publicado: (2025)
AlDBaran: Towards Blazingly Fast State Commitments for Blockchains
por: Kauer, Bernhard, et al.
Publicado: (2025)
por: Kauer, Bernhard, et al.
Publicado: (2025)
Mechanism Design for Exchange Markets
por: Zheng, Yusen, et al.
Publicado: (2024)
por: Zheng, Yusen, et al.
Publicado: (2024)
Blockspace Under Pressure: An Analysis of Spam MEV on High-Throughput Blockchains
por: Wang, Wenhao, et al.
Publicado: (2026)
por: Wang, Wenhao, et al.
Publicado: (2026)
A Game-Theoretic Framework for Privacy-Aware Client Sampling in Federated Learning
por: Yuan, Wenhao, et al.
Publicado: (2024)
por: Yuan, Wenhao, et al.
Publicado: (2024)
Mechanism Design via Market Clearing-Prices for Value Maximizers under Budget and RoS Constraints
por: Liu, Xiaodong, et al.
Publicado: (2026)
por: Liu, Xiaodong, et al.
Publicado: (2026)
QI-DPFL: Quality-Aware and Incentive-Boosted Federated Learning with Differential Privacy
por: Yuan, Wenhao, et al.
Publicado: (2024)
por: Yuan, Wenhao, et al.
Publicado: (2024)
Optimal Mediation Mechanism in Bilateral Trade
por: Fan, Zhikang, et al.
Publicado: (2024)
por: Fan, Zhikang, et al.
Publicado: (2024)
Joint Auction in the Online Advertising Market
por: Zhang, Zhen, et al.
Publicado: (2024)
por: Zhang, Zhen, et al.
Publicado: (2024)
Equal Merit Does Not Imply Equality: Discrimination at Equilibrium in a Hiring Market with Symmetric Agents
por: Kamp, Serafina, et al.
Publicado: (2024)
por: Kamp, Serafina, et al.
Publicado: (2024)
Mechanism Design for Automated Market Makers
por: Chan, T-H. Hubert, et al.
Publicado: (2024)
por: Chan, T-H. Hubert, et al.
Publicado: (2024)
Optimal Fixed-Price Mechanism with Signaling
por: Fan, Zhikang, et al.
Publicado: (2024)
por: Fan, Zhikang, et al.
Publicado: (2024)
GenAI vs. Human Creators: Procurement Mechanism Design in Two-/Three-Layer Markets
por: Ai, Rui, et al.
Publicado: (2025)
por: Ai, Rui, et al.
Publicado: (2025)
Revenue Maximization Mechanisms for an Uninformed Mediator with Communication Abilities
por: Fan, Zhikang, et al.
Publicado: (2024)
por: Fan, Zhikang, et al.
Publicado: (2024)
An Enhanced Dual-Currency VCG Auction Mechanism for Resource Allocation in IoV: A Value of Information Perspective
por: Wang, Wei, et al.
Publicado: (2025)
por: Wang, Wei, et al.
Publicado: (2025)
On Truthful Item-Acquiring Mechanisms for Reward Maximization
por: Shan, Liang, et al.
Publicado: (2024)
por: Shan, Liang, et al.
Publicado: (2024)
Mechanism Design for Congested Facility Location
por: Peng, Cheng, et al.
Publicado: (2024)
por: Peng, Cheng, et al.
Publicado: (2024)
Agentic Markets: Game Dynamics and Equilibrium in Markets with Learning Agents
por: Bichler, Martin, et al.
Publicado: (2025)
por: Bichler, Martin, et al.
Publicado: (2025)
Approximating Gains-from-Trade in Matching Markets
por: Babaioff, Moshe, et al.
Publicado: (2026)
por: Babaioff, Moshe, et al.
Publicado: (2026)
Less-excludable Mechanism for DAOs in Public Good Auctions
por: Chen, Jing, et al.
Publicado: (2025)
por: Chen, Jing, et al.
Publicado: (2025)
Efficiency of Constant Log Utility Market Makers
por: Papireddygari, Maneesha, et al.
Publicado: (2025)
por: Papireddygari, Maneesha, et al.
Publicado: (2025)
Probabilistic Mechanism Design in Diffusion Auctions
por: Zhang, Xinlun, et al.
Publicado: (2026)
por: Zhang, Xinlun, et al.
Publicado: (2026)
Nonbossy Mechanisms: Mechanism Design Robust to Secondary Goals
por: Leme, Renato Paes, et al.
Publicado: (2023)
por: Leme, Renato Paes, et al.
Publicado: (2023)
A General Theory of Liquidity Provisioning for Prediction Markets
por: Bhaskara, Adithya, et al.
Publicado: (2023)
por: Bhaskara, Adithya, et al.
Publicado: (2023)
Learning-Augmented Facility Location Mechanisms for Envy Ratio
por: Aziz, Haris, et al.
Publicado: (2025)
por: Aziz, Haris, et al.
Publicado: (2025)
An Analysis of Intent-Based Markets
por: Chitra, Tarun, et al.
Publicado: (2024)
por: Chitra, Tarun, et al.
Publicado: (2024)
New Adaptive Mechanism for Large Neighborhood Search using Dual Actor-Critic
por: Yu, Shaohua, et al.
Publicado: (2026)
por: Yu, Shaohua, et al.
Publicado: (2026)
Market Equilibria With Buying Rights
por: Loebl, Martin, et al.
Publicado: (2025)
por: Loebl, Martin, et al.
Publicado: (2025)
Bandit Learning in Housing Markets
por: Lin, Shiyun
Publicado: (2025)
por: Lin, Shiyun
Publicado: (2025)
Strategic AI in Cournot Markets
por: Deshpande, Sanyukta, et al.
Publicado: (2026)
por: Deshpande, Sanyukta, et al.
Publicado: (2026)
RediSwap: MEV Redistribution Mechanism for CFMMs
por: Zhang, Mengqian, et al.
Publicado: (2024)
por: Zhang, Mengqian, et al.
Publicado: (2024)
Bayesian Mechanism Design for Blockchain Transaction Fee Allocation
por: Chen, Xi, et al.
Publicado: (2022)
por: Chen, Xi, et al.
Publicado: (2022)
Mechanism Design with Delegated Bidding
por: Aggarwal, Gagan, et al.
Publicado: (2024)
por: Aggarwal, Gagan, et al.
Publicado: (2024)
Ejemplares similares
-
TierDrop: Harnessing Airdrop Farmers for User Growth
por: Yaish, Aviv, et al.
Publicado: (2024) -
Discrete & Bayesian Transaction Fee Mechanisms
por: Gafni, Yotam, et al.
Publicado: (2022) -
Barriers to Collusion-resistant Transaction Fee Mechanisms
por: Gafni, Yotam, et al.
Publicado: (2024) -
Perils of Parallelism: Transaction Fee Mechanisms under Execution Uncertainty
por: Wadhwa, Sarisht, et al.
Publicado: (2026) -
Your Loss is My Gain: Low Stake Attacks on Liquid Staking Pools
por: Yang, Sen, et al.
Publicado: (2026)