Security Assessment of the LG Cryptosystem

Fuente: arXiv
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Hauptverfasser: Burle, Étienne, Kalachi, Hervé Talé, Metouke, Freddy Lende, Otmani, Ayoub
Format: Preprint
Veröffentlicht: 2024
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author Burle, Étienne
Kalachi, Hervé Talé
Metouke, Freddy Lende
Otmani, Ayoub
author_facet Burle, Étienne
Kalachi, Hervé Talé
Metouke, Freddy Lende
Otmani, Ayoub
contents The LG cryptosystem is a public-key encryption scheme in the rank metric using the recent family of $\lambdav-$Gabidulin codes and introduced in 2019 by Lau and Tan. In this paper, we present a cryptanalysis showing that the security of several parameters of the scheme have been overestimated. We also show the existence of some weak keys allowing an attacker to find in polynomial time an alternative private key.
format Preprint
id arxiv_https___arxiv_org_abs_2404_06815
institution arXiv
publishDate 2024
record_format arxiv
spellingShingle Security Assessment of the LG Cryptosystem
Burle, Étienne
Kalachi, Hervé Talé
Metouke, Freddy Lende
Otmani, Ayoub
Cryptography and Security
The LG cryptosystem is a public-key encryption scheme in the rank metric using the recent family of $\lambdav-$Gabidulin codes and introduced in 2019 by Lau and Tan. In this paper, we present a cryptanalysis showing that the security of several parameters of the scheme have been overestimated. We also show the existence of some weak keys allowing an attacker to find in polynomial time an alternative private key.
title Security Assessment of the LG Cryptosystem
topic Cryptography and Security
url https://arxiv.org/abs/2404.06815