Nash Equilibrium Seeking for Noncooperative Duopoly Games via Event-Triggered Control

Fuente: arXiv
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Autori principali: Rodrigues, Victor Hugo Pereira, Oliveira, Tiago Roux, Krstić, Miroslav, Başar, Tamer
Natura: Preprint
Pubblicazione: 2024
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author Rodrigues, Victor Hugo Pereira
Oliveira, Tiago Roux
Krstić, Miroslav
Başar, Tamer
author_facet Rodrigues, Victor Hugo Pereira
Oliveira, Tiago Roux
Krstić, Miroslav
Başar, Tamer
contents This paper proposes a novel approach for locally stable convergence to Nash equilibrium in duopoly noncooperative games based on a distributed event-triggered control scheme. The proposed approach employs extremum seeking, with sinusoidal perturbation signals applied to estimate the Gradient (first derivative) of unknown quadratic payoff functions. This is the first instance of noncooperative games being tackled in a model-free fashion integrated with the event-triggered methodology. Each player evaluates independently the deviation between the corresponding current state variable and its last broadcasted value to update the player action, while they preserve control performance under limited bandwidth of the actuation paths and still guarantee stability for the closed-loop dynamics. In particular, the stability analysis is carried out using time-scaling technique, Lyapunov's direct method and averaging theory for discontinuous systems. We quantify the size of the ultimate small residual sets around the Nash equilibrium and illustrate the theoretical results numerically on an example.
format Preprint
id arxiv_https___arxiv_org_abs_2404_07287
institution arXiv
publishDate 2024
record_format arxiv
spellingShingle Nash Equilibrium Seeking for Noncooperative Duopoly Games via Event-Triggered Control
Rodrigues, Victor Hugo Pereira
Oliveira, Tiago Roux
Krstić, Miroslav
Başar, Tamer
Optimization and Control
Systems and Control
This paper proposes a novel approach for locally stable convergence to Nash equilibrium in duopoly noncooperative games based on a distributed event-triggered control scheme. The proposed approach employs extremum seeking, with sinusoidal perturbation signals applied to estimate the Gradient (first derivative) of unknown quadratic payoff functions. This is the first instance of noncooperative games being tackled in a model-free fashion integrated with the event-triggered methodology. Each player evaluates independently the deviation between the corresponding current state variable and its last broadcasted value to update the player action, while they preserve control performance under limited bandwidth of the actuation paths and still guarantee stability for the closed-loop dynamics. In particular, the stability analysis is carried out using time-scaling technique, Lyapunov's direct method and averaging theory for discontinuous systems. We quantify the size of the ultimate small residual sets around the Nash equilibrium and illustrate the theoretical results numerically on an example.
title Nash Equilibrium Seeking for Noncooperative Duopoly Games via Event-Triggered Control
topic Optimization and Control
Systems and Control
url https://arxiv.org/abs/2404.07287