A Measurement of Genuine Tor Traces for Realistic Website Fingerprinting
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arXiv
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| Auteurs principaux: | , , |
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| Format: | Preprint |
| Publié: |
2024
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| _version_ | 1866914269959815168 |
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| author | Jansen, Rob Wails, Ryan Johnson, Aaron |
| author_facet | Jansen, Rob Wails, Ryan Johnson, Aaron |
| contents | Website fingerprinting (WF) is a dangerous attack on web privacy because it enables an adversary to predict the website a user is visiting, despite the use of encryption, VPNs, or anonymizing networks such as Tor. Previous WF work almost exclusively uses synthetic datasets to evaluate the performance and estimate the feasibility of WF attacks despite evidence that synthetic data misrepresents the real world. In this paper we present GTT23, the first WF dataset of genuine Tor traces, which we obtain through a large-scale measurement of the Tor network and which is intended especially for WF. It represents real Tor user behavior better than any existing WF dataset, is larger than any existing WF dataset by at least an order of magnitude, and will help ground the future study of realistic WF attacks and defenses. In a detailed evaluation, we survey 28 WF datasets published since 2008 and compare their characteristics to those of GTT23. We discover common deficiencies of synthetic datasets that make them inferior to GTT23 for drawing meaningful conclusions about the effectiveness of WF attacks directed at real Tor users. We have made GTT23 available to promote reproducible research and to help inspire new directions for future work. |
| format | Preprint |
| id |
arxiv_https___arxiv_org_abs_2404_07892 |
| institution | arXiv |
| publishDate | 2024 |
| record_format | arxiv |
| spellingShingle | A Measurement of Genuine Tor Traces for Realistic Website Fingerprinting Jansen, Rob Wails, Ryan Johnson, Aaron Cryptography and Security Website fingerprinting (WF) is a dangerous attack on web privacy because it enables an adversary to predict the website a user is visiting, despite the use of encryption, VPNs, or anonymizing networks such as Tor. Previous WF work almost exclusively uses synthetic datasets to evaluate the performance and estimate the feasibility of WF attacks despite evidence that synthetic data misrepresents the real world. In this paper we present GTT23, the first WF dataset of genuine Tor traces, which we obtain through a large-scale measurement of the Tor network and which is intended especially for WF. It represents real Tor user behavior better than any existing WF dataset, is larger than any existing WF dataset by at least an order of magnitude, and will help ground the future study of realistic WF attacks and defenses. In a detailed evaluation, we survey 28 WF datasets published since 2008 and compare their characteristics to those of GTT23. We discover common deficiencies of synthetic datasets that make them inferior to GTT23 for drawing meaningful conclusions about the effectiveness of WF attacks directed at real Tor users. We have made GTT23 available to promote reproducible research and to help inspire new directions for future work. |
| title | A Measurement of Genuine Tor Traces for Realistic Website Fingerprinting |
| topic | Cryptography and Security |
| url | https://arxiv.org/abs/2404.07892 |