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Istanbul Flower Auction: The Need for Speed

Fuente: arXiv

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Bibliographic Details
Main Authors:	Hafalir, Isa, Kesten, Onur, Luo, Donglai, Sherstyuk, Katerina, Tao, Cong
Format:	Preprint
Published:	2024
Subjects:	Theoretical Economics
Online Access:	Acceder al recurso
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