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The Squared Kemeny Rule for Averaging Rankings

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Bibliographic Details
Main Authors:	Lederer, Patrick, Peters, Dominik, Wąs, Tomasz
Format:	Preprint
Published:	2024
Subjects:	Computer Science and Game Theory Theoretical Economics
Online Access:	Acceder al recurso
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