PrintListener: Uncovering the Vulnerability of Fingerprint Authentication via the Finger Friction Sound
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arXiv
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| Autores principales: | , , , , , , |
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| Formato: | Preprint |
| Publicado: |
2024
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| Materias: | |
| Acceso en línea: | |
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| _version_ | 1866913314737487872 |
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| author | Zhou, Man Su, Shuao Wang, Qian Li, Qi Zhou, Yuting Ma, Xiaojing Li, Zhengxiong |
| author_facet | Zhou, Man Su, Shuao Wang, Qian Li, Qi Zhou, Yuting Ma, Xiaojing Li, Zhengxiong |
| contents | Fingerprint authentication has been extensively employed in contemporary identity verification systems owing to its rapidity and cost-effectiveness. Due to its widespread use, fingerprint leakage may cause sensitive information theft, enormous economic and personnel losses, and even a potential compromise of national security. As a fingerprint that can coincidentally match a specific proportion of the overall fingerprint population, MasterPrint rings the alarm bells for the security of fingerprint authentication. In this paper, we propose a new side-channel attack on the minutiae-based Automatic Fingerprint Identification System (AFIS), called PrintListener, which leverages users' fingertip swiping actions on the screen to extract fingerprint pattern features (the first-level features) and synthesizes a stronger targeted PatternMasterPrint with potential second-level features. The attack scenario of PrintListener is extensive and covert. It only needs to record users' fingertip friction sound and can be launched by leveraging a large number of social media platforms. Extensive experimental results in realworld scenarios show that Printlistener can significantly improve the attack potency of MasterPrint. |
| format | Preprint |
| id |
arxiv_https___arxiv_org_abs_2404_09214 |
| institution | arXiv |
| publishDate | 2024 |
| record_format | arxiv |
| spellingShingle | PrintListener: Uncovering the Vulnerability of Fingerprint Authentication via the Finger Friction Sound Zhou, Man Su, Shuao Wang, Qian Li, Qi Zhou, Yuting Ma, Xiaojing Li, Zhengxiong Cryptography and Security Fingerprint authentication has been extensively employed in contemporary identity verification systems owing to its rapidity and cost-effectiveness. Due to its widespread use, fingerprint leakage may cause sensitive information theft, enormous economic and personnel losses, and even a potential compromise of national security. As a fingerprint that can coincidentally match a specific proportion of the overall fingerprint population, MasterPrint rings the alarm bells for the security of fingerprint authentication. In this paper, we propose a new side-channel attack on the minutiae-based Automatic Fingerprint Identification System (AFIS), called PrintListener, which leverages users' fingertip swiping actions on the screen to extract fingerprint pattern features (the first-level features) and synthesizes a stronger targeted PatternMasterPrint with potential second-level features. The attack scenario of PrintListener is extensive and covert. It only needs to record users' fingertip friction sound and can be launched by leveraging a large number of social media platforms. Extensive experimental results in realworld scenarios show that Printlistener can significantly improve the attack potency of MasterPrint. |
| title | PrintListener: Uncovering the Vulnerability of Fingerprint Authentication via the Finger Friction Sound |
| topic | Cryptography and Security |
| url | https://arxiv.org/abs/2404.09214 |