Stability Certificates for Receding Horizon Games
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arXiv
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| Hauptverfasser: | , , , |
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| Format: | Preprint |
| Veröffentlicht: |
2024
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| author | Hall, Sophie Liao-McPherson, Dominic Belgioioso, Giuseppe Dörfler, Florian |
| author_facet | Hall, Sophie Liao-McPherson, Dominic Belgioioso, Giuseppe Dörfler, Florian |
| contents | Game-theoretic MPC (or Receding Horizon Games) is an emerging control methodology for multi-agent systems that generates control actions by solving a dynamic game with coupling constraints in a receding-horizon fashion. This control paradigm has recently received an increasing attention in various application fields, including robotics, autonomous driving, traffic networks, and energy grids, due to its ability to model the competitive nature of self-interested agents with shared resources while incorporating future predictions, dynamic models, and constraints into the decision-making process. In this work, we present the first formal stability analysis based on dissipativity and monotone operator theory that is valid also for non-potential games. Specifically, we derive LMI-based certificates that ensure asymptotic stability and are numerically verifiable. Moreover, we show that, if the agents have decoupled dynamics, the numerical verification can be performed in a scalable manner. Finally, we present tuning guidelines for the agents' cost function weights to fulfill the certificates and, thus, ensure stability. |
| format | Preprint |
| id |
arxiv_https___arxiv_org_abs_2404_12165 |
| institution | arXiv |
| publishDate | 2024 |
| record_format | arxiv |
| spellingShingle | Stability Certificates for Receding Horizon Games Hall, Sophie Liao-McPherson, Dominic Belgioioso, Giuseppe Dörfler, Florian Systems and Control Game-theoretic MPC (or Receding Horizon Games) is an emerging control methodology for multi-agent systems that generates control actions by solving a dynamic game with coupling constraints in a receding-horizon fashion. This control paradigm has recently received an increasing attention in various application fields, including robotics, autonomous driving, traffic networks, and energy grids, due to its ability to model the competitive nature of self-interested agents with shared resources while incorporating future predictions, dynamic models, and constraints into the decision-making process. In this work, we present the first formal stability analysis based on dissipativity and monotone operator theory that is valid also for non-potential games. Specifically, we derive LMI-based certificates that ensure asymptotic stability and are numerically verifiable. Moreover, we show that, if the agents have decoupled dynamics, the numerical verification can be performed in a scalable manner. Finally, we present tuning guidelines for the agents' cost function weights to fulfill the certificates and, thus, ensure stability. |
| title | Stability Certificates for Receding Horizon Games |
| topic | Systems and Control |
| url | https://arxiv.org/abs/2404.12165 |