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| Main Authors: | , , , , |
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| Format: | Preprint |
| Published: |
2024
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| Subjects: | |
| Online Access: | https://arxiv.org/abs/2404.14246 |
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| _version_ | 1866909290668752896 |
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| author | Janovsky, Adam Chmielewski, Łukasz Svenda, Petr Jancar, Jan Matyas, Vashek |
| author_facet | Janovsky, Adam Chmielewski, Łukasz Svenda, Petr Jancar, Jan Matyas, Vashek |
| contents | With 5394 security certificates of IT products and systems, the Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation have bred an ecosystem entangled with various kind of relations between the certified products. Yet, the prevalence and nature of dependencies among Common Criteria certified products remains largely unexplored. This study devises a novel method for building the graph of references among the Common Criteria certified products, determining the different contexts of references with a supervised machine-learning algorithm, and measuring how often the references constitute actual dependencies between the certified products. With the help of the resulting reference graph, this work identifies just a dozen of certified components that are relied on by at least 10% of the whole ecosystem -- making them a prime target for malicious actors. The impact of their compromise is assessed and potentially problematic references to archived products are discussed. |
| format | Preprint |
| id |
arxiv_https___arxiv_org_abs_2404_14246 |
| institution | arXiv |
| publishDate | 2024 |
| record_format | arxiv |
| spellingShingle | Chain of trust: Unraveling references among Common Criteria certified products Janovsky, Adam Chmielewski, Łukasz Svenda, Petr Jancar, Jan Matyas, Vashek Cryptography and Security 10.1007/978-3-031-65175-5_14 With 5394 security certificates of IT products and systems, the Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation have bred an ecosystem entangled with various kind of relations between the certified products. Yet, the prevalence and nature of dependencies among Common Criteria certified products remains largely unexplored. This study devises a novel method for building the graph of references among the Common Criteria certified products, determining the different contexts of references with a supervised machine-learning algorithm, and measuring how often the references constitute actual dependencies between the certified products. With the help of the resulting reference graph, this work identifies just a dozen of certified components that are relied on by at least 10% of the whole ecosystem -- making them a prime target for malicious actors. The impact of their compromise is assessed and potentially problematic references to archived products are discussed. |
| title | Chain of trust: Unraveling references among Common Criteria certified products |
| topic | Cryptography and Security 10.1007/978-3-031-65175-5_14 |
| url | https://arxiv.org/abs/2404.14246 |