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Maximal Procurement under a Budget

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Bibliographic Details
Main Authors:	Immorlica, Nicole, Wu, Nicholas, Lucier, Brendan
Format:	Preprint
Published:	2024
Subjects:	Theoretical Economics
Online Access:	Acceder al recurso
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