Now Let's Make It Physical: Enabling Physically Trusted Certificate Issuance for Keyless Security in CAs

Fuente: arXiv
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Autori principali: Zhang, Xiaolin, Chen, Chenghao, Qin, Kailun, Wang, Yuxuan, Qu, Shipei, Wang, Tengfei, Zhang, Chi, Gu, Dawu
Natura: Preprint
Pubblicazione: 2024
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author Zhang, Xiaolin
Chen, Chenghao
Qin, Kailun
Wang, Yuxuan
Qu, Shipei
Wang, Tengfei
Zhang, Chi
Gu, Dawu
author_facet Zhang, Xiaolin
Chen, Chenghao
Qin, Kailun
Wang, Yuxuan
Qu, Shipei
Wang, Tengfei
Zhang, Chi
Gu, Dawu
contents The signing key protection of Certificate Authorities (CAs) remains a critical challenge in PKI. Traditional approaches struggle to eliminate the risk of key exposure due to those (un)intentional human errors. This long-standing dilemma motivates us to propose Armored Core, a novel PKI security extension using the trusted binding of Physically Unclonable Function (PUF) for CAs. PUFs leverage manufacturing variations to generate unique and random responses. Combining with XOR and hash, they can make key exposure impossible for CAs through keyless certificate issuance. In Armored Core, we design a set of PUF-based X.509v3 certificate functions for CAs to generate physically trusted "signatures" without using a digital key. Moreover, we introduce a novel PUF transparency mechanism to effectively monitor the PUF operations in CAs. We integrate Armored Core into real-world PKI systems including Let's Encrypt Pebble and Certbot. We also provide a PUF-embedded hardware prototype. The evaluation results show that Armored Core can achieve keyless certificate issuance while improving the computation performance by 4.9%~73.7%. It only incurs small communication and storage overhead (<4%).
format Preprint
id arxiv_https___arxiv_org_abs_2404_15582
institution arXiv
publishDate 2024
record_format arxiv
spellingShingle Now Let's Make It Physical: Enabling Physically Trusted Certificate Issuance for Keyless Security in CAs
Zhang, Xiaolin
Chen, Chenghao
Qin, Kailun
Wang, Yuxuan
Qu, Shipei
Wang, Tengfei
Zhang, Chi
Gu, Dawu
Cryptography and Security
The signing key protection of Certificate Authorities (CAs) remains a critical challenge in PKI. Traditional approaches struggle to eliminate the risk of key exposure due to those (un)intentional human errors. This long-standing dilemma motivates us to propose Armored Core, a novel PKI security extension using the trusted binding of Physically Unclonable Function (PUF) for CAs. PUFs leverage manufacturing variations to generate unique and random responses. Combining with XOR and hash, they can make key exposure impossible for CAs through keyless certificate issuance. In Armored Core, we design a set of PUF-based X.509v3 certificate functions for CAs to generate physically trusted "signatures" without using a digital key. Moreover, we introduce a novel PUF transparency mechanism to effectively monitor the PUF operations in CAs. We integrate Armored Core into real-world PKI systems including Let's Encrypt Pebble and Certbot. We also provide a PUF-embedded hardware prototype. The evaluation results show that Armored Core can achieve keyless certificate issuance while improving the computation performance by 4.9%~73.7%. It only incurs small communication and storage overhead (<4%).
title Now Let's Make It Physical: Enabling Physically Trusted Certificate Issuance for Keyless Security in CAs
topic Cryptography and Security
url https://arxiv.org/abs/2404.15582