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Artificial Intelligence for Multi-Unit Auction design

Fuente: arXiv

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Détails bibliographiques
Auteurs principaux:	Khezr, Peyman, Taylor, Kendall
Format:	Preprint
Publié:	2024
Sujets:	Computer Science and Game Theory Artificial Intelligence Theoretical Economics
Accès en ligne:	Acceder al recurso
Tags:	Ajouter un tag Pas de tags, Soyez le premier à ajouter un tag!

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