Decentralized Finance and Local Public Goods: A Bayesian Maximum Entropy Model of School District Spending in the U.S

Fuente: arXiv
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Autore principale: Melo, Juan
Natura: Preprint
Pubblicazione: 2024
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author Melo, Juan
author_facet Melo, Juan
contents This paper investigates the distribution of public school expenditures across U.S. school districts using a bayesian maximum entropy model. Covering the period 2000-2016, I explore how inter-jurisdictional competition and household choice influence spending patterns within the public education sector, providing a novel empirical treatment of the Tiebout hypothesis within a statistical equilibrium framework. The analysis reveals that these expenditures are characterized by sharply peaked and positively skewed distributions, suggesting significant socioeconomic stratification. Employing Bayesian inference and Markov Chain Monte Carlo (MCMC) sampling, I fit these patterns into a statistical equilibrium model to elucidate the roles of competition, as well as household mobility and arbitrage in shaping the distribution of educational spending. The analysis reveals how the scale parameters associated with competition and household choice critically shape the equilibrium outcomes. The model and analysis offer a statistical basis for shaping policy measures intended to affect distributional outcomes in scenarios characterized by the decentralized provision of local public goods.
format Preprint
id arxiv_https___arxiv_org_abs_2404_17700
institution arXiv
publishDate 2024
record_format arxiv
spellingShingle Decentralized Finance and Local Public Goods: A Bayesian Maximum Entropy Model of School District Spending in the U.S
Melo, Juan
Applications
General Economics
Economics
62P20
This paper investigates the distribution of public school expenditures across U.S. school districts using a bayesian maximum entropy model. Covering the period 2000-2016, I explore how inter-jurisdictional competition and household choice influence spending patterns within the public education sector, providing a novel empirical treatment of the Tiebout hypothesis within a statistical equilibrium framework. The analysis reveals that these expenditures are characterized by sharply peaked and positively skewed distributions, suggesting significant socioeconomic stratification. Employing Bayesian inference and Markov Chain Monte Carlo (MCMC) sampling, I fit these patterns into a statistical equilibrium model to elucidate the roles of competition, as well as household mobility and arbitrage in shaping the distribution of educational spending. The analysis reveals how the scale parameters associated with competition and household choice critically shape the equilibrium outcomes. The model and analysis offer a statistical basis for shaping policy measures intended to affect distributional outcomes in scenarios characterized by the decentralized provision of local public goods.
title Decentralized Finance and Local Public Goods: A Bayesian Maximum Entropy Model of School District Spending in the U.S
topic Applications
General Economics
Economics
62P20
url https://arxiv.org/abs/2404.17700