Desirability and social rankings
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arXiv
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| Auteurs principaux: | , , |
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| Format: | Preprint |
| Publié: |
2024
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| _version_ | 1866909184131334144 |
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| author | Aleandri, Michele Fritz, Felix Moretti, Stefano |
| author_facet | Aleandri, Michele Fritz, Felix Moretti, Stefano |
| contents | In coalitional games, a player $i$ is regarded as strictly more desirable than player $j$ if substituting $j$ with $i$ within any coalition leads to a strict augmentation in the value of certain coalitions, while preserving the value of the others. We adopt a property-driven approach to 'integrate' the notion of the desirability relation into a total relation by establishing sets of independent axioms leading to the characterization of solutionconcepts from the related literature. We focus on social ranking solutions consistent with the desirability relation and propose complementary sets of properties for the axiomatic characterization of five existing solutions: Ceteris Paribus (CP-)majority, lexicographic excellence (lex-cel), dual-lex, $L^{(1)}$ solution and its dual version $L^{(1)}_{*}$ . These characterizations reveal additional similarities among the five solutions and emphasize the essential characteristics that should be taken into account when selecting a social ranking. A practical scenario involving a bicameral legislature is studied. |
| format | Preprint |
| id |
arxiv_https___arxiv_org_abs_2404_18755 |
| institution | arXiv |
| publishDate | 2024 |
| record_format | arxiv |
| spellingShingle | Desirability and social rankings Aleandri, Michele Fritz, Felix Moretti, Stefano Computer Science and Game Theory 91A35, 91B12 In coalitional games, a player $i$ is regarded as strictly more desirable than player $j$ if substituting $j$ with $i$ within any coalition leads to a strict augmentation in the value of certain coalitions, while preserving the value of the others. We adopt a property-driven approach to 'integrate' the notion of the desirability relation into a total relation by establishing sets of independent axioms leading to the characterization of solutionconcepts from the related literature. We focus on social ranking solutions consistent with the desirability relation and propose complementary sets of properties for the axiomatic characterization of five existing solutions: Ceteris Paribus (CP-)majority, lexicographic excellence (lex-cel), dual-lex, $L^{(1)}$ solution and its dual version $L^{(1)}_{*}$ . These characterizations reveal additional similarities among the five solutions and emphasize the essential characteristics that should be taken into account when selecting a social ranking. A practical scenario involving a bicameral legislature is studied. |
| title | Desirability and social rankings |
| topic | Computer Science and Game Theory 91A35, 91B12 |
| url | https://arxiv.org/abs/2404.18755 |