Image de couverture de livre

Persuasion in Networks: Can the Sender Do Better than Using Public Signals?

Fuente: arXiv

Enregistré dans:

Détails bibliographiques
Auteur principal:	Zhang, Yifan
Format:	Preprint
Publié:	2024
Sujets:	Theoretical Economics
Accès en ligne:	Acceder al recurso
Tags:	Ajouter un tag Pas de tags, Soyez le premier à ajouter un tag!

Documents similaires

Costly Persuasion by a Partially Informed Sender
par: Jiang, Shaofei
Publié: (2024)

Multi-Sender Disclosure with Costs
par: Kartik, Navin, et autres
Publié: (2026)

Persuasive Selection in Signaling Games
par: Zeng, Haoyuan
Publié: (2025)

Bayesian Persuasion with Selective Disclosure
par: Dai, Yifan, et autres
Publié: (2026)

Mutual Reputation and Trust in a Repeated Sender-Receiver Game
par: Lukyanov, Georgy
Publié: (2025)

Public Persuasion with Endogenous Fact-Checking
par: Lukyanov, Georgy, et autres
Publié: (2025)

Persuasion with Verifiable Information
par: Titova, Maria, et autres
Publié: (2025)

On Monotone Persuasion
par: Kolotilin, Anton, et autres
Publié: (2024)

Causal Persuasion
par: Burkovskaya, Anastasia, et autres
Publié: (2026)

The Persuasion Duality
par: Dworczak, Piotr, et autres
Publié: (2019)

Frequentist Persuasion
par: Sood, Arnav, et autres
Publié: (2025)

Screening with Persuasion
par: Bergemann, Dirk, et autres
Publié: (2022)

Persuasion with Ambiguous Communication
par: Cheng, Xiaoyu, et autres
Publié: (2024)

Persuasion and Optimal Stopping
par: Koh, Andrew, et autres
Publié: (2024)

Perfect Bayesian Persuasion
par: Lipnowski, Elliot, et autres
Publié: (2024)

Competition, Persuasion, and Search
par: Mekonnen, Teddy, et autres
Publié: (2024)

Revealed Bayesian Persuasion
par: Mensch, Jeffrey
Publié: (2025)

Persuasion with Coarse Communication
par: Aybas, Yunus C., et autres
Publié: (2019)

Persuasion in Lemons Markets
par: Paolo, Andrea Di Giovan, et autres
Publié: (2025)

Dynamic Non-Bayesian Persuasion
par: Kobayashi, Masanori
Publié: (2025)

Bayesian Persuasion without Commitment
par: Arieli, Itai, et autres
Publié: (2025)

Persuasion with Ambiguous Receiver Preferences
par: Sapiro-Gheiler, Eitan
Publié: (2021)

Sequential Non-Bayesian Persuasion
par: Azrieli, Yaron, et autres
Publié: (2025)

Team Disagreement and Productive Persuasion
par: Bonomi, Giampaolo
Publié: (2025)

Markovian Persuasion with Stochastic Revelations
par: Lehrer, Ehud, et autres
Publié: (2022)

Robustness of Persuasion to Receiver Preferences
par: Gradwohl, Ronen, et autres
Publié: (2026)

Ambiguous Persuasion with Prior Ambiguity
par: Cheng, Xiaoyu
Publié: (2025)

Ambiguous Persuasion: An Ex-Ante Formulation
par: Cheng, Xiaoyu
Publié: (2020)

Moral Hazard in Delegated Bayesian Persuasion
par: Fotso, Wilfried Youmbi, et autres
Publié: (2026)

Bayesian Persuasion under Bias Management
par: Ozbek, Kemal
Publié: (2026)

Accelerator and Brake: Dynamic Persuasion with Dead Ends
par: Chen, Zhuo, et autres
Publié: (2026)

Persuasion in the Long Run: When history matters
par: Ko, Hyeonggyun
Publié: (2025)

Information Greenhouse: Optimal Persuasion for Medical Test-Avoiders
par: Chen, Zhuo
Publié: (2024)

Network Threshold Games
par: Langtry, Alastair, et autres
Publié: (2024)

When Do Markets Work? Multiplex Networks and Efficiency
par: Li, Chengqing, et autres
Publié: (2026)

Public Goods Provision in Directed Networks: A Kernel Approach
par: Huang, Jingmin, et autres
Publié: (2025)

Best Garbling is No Garbling: Persuasion in Real Time
par: Urgun, Can, et autres
Publié: (2025)

Signaling Design
par: Camboni, Matteo, et autres
Publié: (2025)

Signaling With Commitment
par: Boleslavsky, Raphael, et autres
Publié: (2023)

Preference Measurement Error, Concentration in Recommendation Systems, and Persuasion
par: Haupt, Andreas
Publié: (2025)