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Autor principal: Suwannik, Worasait
Formato: Preprint
Publicado: 2024
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Acceso en línea:https://arxiv.org/abs/2404.19064
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author Suwannik, Worasait
author_facet Suwannik, Worasait
contents Multiple sequence alignment (MSA) is a fundamental algorithm in bioinformatics. In a situation when the alignment might need to be protected while revealing the other information such the input sequences and the alignment score, zero knowledge proof can be used. In this paper, a validator checks the consistency between the input sequence and the alignment, and between the alignment and the alignment score. The validator is written in Circom language which will be compile into a circuit. Using a zero knowledge prove system called zkSNARK, a cryptographic proof is generates for the circuit and its input. This proof demonstrates that all inputs are consistent without revealing the actual alignment.
format Preprint
id arxiv_https___arxiv_org_abs_2404_19064
institution arXiv
publishDate 2024
record_format arxiv
spellingShingle Zero Knowledge Proof for Multiple Sequence Alignment
Suwannik, Worasait
Cryptography and Security
Multiple sequence alignment (MSA) is a fundamental algorithm in bioinformatics. In a situation when the alignment might need to be protected while revealing the other information such the input sequences and the alignment score, zero knowledge proof can be used. In this paper, a validator checks the consistency between the input sequence and the alignment, and between the alignment and the alignment score. The validator is written in Circom language which will be compile into a circuit. Using a zero knowledge prove system called zkSNARK, a cryptographic proof is generates for the circuit and its input. This proof demonstrates that all inputs are consistent without revealing the actual alignment.
title Zero Knowledge Proof for Multiple Sequence Alignment
topic Cryptography and Security
url https://arxiv.org/abs/2404.19064