AI, Pluralism, and (Social) Compensation
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arXiv
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| Auteurs principaux: | , |
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| Format: | Preprint |
| Publié: |
2024
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| _version_ | 1866917804316295168 |
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| author | Swaminathan, Nandhini Danks, David |
| author_facet | Swaminathan, Nandhini Danks, David |
| contents | One strategy in response to pluralistic values in a user population is to personalize an AI system: if the AI can adapt to the specific values of each individual, then we can potentially avoid many of the challenges of pluralism. Unfortunately, this approach creates a significant ethical issue: if there is an external measure of success for the human-AI team, then the adaptive AI system may develop strategies (sometimes deceptive) to compensate for its human teammate. This phenomenon can be viewed as a form of social compensation, where the AI makes decisions based not on predefined goals but on its human partner's deficiencies in relation to the team's performance objectives. We provide a practical ethical analysis of the conditions in which such compensation may nonetheless be justifiable. |
| format | Preprint |
| id |
arxiv_https___arxiv_org_abs_2404_19256 |
| institution | arXiv |
| publishDate | 2024 |
| record_format | arxiv |
| spellingShingle | AI, Pluralism, and (Social) Compensation Swaminathan, Nandhini Danks, David Artificial Intelligence Computers and Society Computer Science and Game Theory Human-Computer Interaction Machine Learning Multiagent Systems I.2.0, 91A, 68T05 One strategy in response to pluralistic values in a user population is to personalize an AI system: if the AI can adapt to the specific values of each individual, then we can potentially avoid many of the challenges of pluralism. Unfortunately, this approach creates a significant ethical issue: if there is an external measure of success for the human-AI team, then the adaptive AI system may develop strategies (sometimes deceptive) to compensate for its human teammate. This phenomenon can be viewed as a form of social compensation, where the AI makes decisions based not on predefined goals but on its human partner's deficiencies in relation to the team's performance objectives. We provide a practical ethical analysis of the conditions in which such compensation may nonetheless be justifiable. |
| title | AI, Pluralism, and (Social) Compensation |
| topic | Artificial Intelligence Computers and Society Computer Science and Game Theory Human-Computer Interaction Machine Learning Multiagent Systems I.2.0, 91A, 68T05 |
| url | https://arxiv.org/abs/2404.19256 |