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| Main Authors: | , , |
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| Format: | Preprint |
| Published: |
2024
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| Subjects: | |
| Online Access: | https://arxiv.org/abs/2404.19361 |
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| _version_ | 1866917654378315776 |
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| author | Florijn, Tamara C. P. Yolum, Pinar Baarslag, Tim |
| author_facet | Florijn, Tamara C. P. Yolum, Pinar Baarslag, Tim |
| contents | Automated negotiation is a well-known mechanism for autonomous agents to reach agreements. To realize beneficial agreements quickly, it is key to employ a good bidding strategy. When a negotiating agent has a good back-up plan, i.e., a high reservation value, failing to reach an agreement is not necessarily disadvantageous. Thus, the agent can adopt a risk-seeking strategy, aiming for outcomes with a higher utilities.
Accordingly, this paper develops an optimal bidding strategy called MIA-RVelous for bilateral negotiations with private reservation values. The proposed greedy algorithm finds the optimal bid sequence given the agent's beliefs about the opponent in $O(n^2D)$ time, with $D$ the maximum number of rounds and $n$ the number of outcomes. The results obtained here can pave the way to realizing effective concurrent negotiations, given that concurrent negotiations can serve as a (probabilistic) backup plan. |
| format | Preprint |
| id |
arxiv_https___arxiv_org_abs_2404_19361 |
| institution | arXiv |
| publishDate | 2024 |
| record_format | arxiv |
| spellingShingle | A Negotiator's Backup Plan: Optimal Concessions with a Reservation Value Florijn, Tamara C. P. Yolum, Pinar Baarslag, Tim Computer Science and Game Theory Artificial Intelligence Automated negotiation is a well-known mechanism for autonomous agents to reach agreements. To realize beneficial agreements quickly, it is key to employ a good bidding strategy. When a negotiating agent has a good back-up plan, i.e., a high reservation value, failing to reach an agreement is not necessarily disadvantageous. Thus, the agent can adopt a risk-seeking strategy, aiming for outcomes with a higher utilities. Accordingly, this paper develops an optimal bidding strategy called MIA-RVelous for bilateral negotiations with private reservation values. The proposed greedy algorithm finds the optimal bid sequence given the agent's beliefs about the opponent in $O(n^2D)$ time, with $D$ the maximum number of rounds and $n$ the number of outcomes. The results obtained here can pave the way to realizing effective concurrent negotiations, given that concurrent negotiations can serve as a (probabilistic) backup plan. |
| title | A Negotiator's Backup Plan: Optimal Concessions with a Reservation Value |
| topic | Computer Science and Game Theory Artificial Intelligence |
| url | https://arxiv.org/abs/2404.19361 |