Proof of Sampling: A Nash Equilibrium-Based Verification Protocol for Decentralized Systems

Fuente: arXiv
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Auteurs principaux: Zhang, Yue, Wang, Shouqiao, Tan, Sijun, Liu, Xiaoyuan, Moallemi, Ciamac C., Popa, Raluca Ada
Format: Preprint
Publié: 2024
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author Zhang, Yue
Wang, Shouqiao
Tan, Sijun
Liu, Xiaoyuan
Moallemi, Ciamac C.
Popa, Raluca Ada
author_facet Zhang, Yue
Wang, Shouqiao
Tan, Sijun
Liu, Xiaoyuan
Moallemi, Ciamac C.
Popa, Raluca Ada
contents This paper introduces the Proof of Sampling (PoSP) protocol, a Nash Equilibrium-based verification mechanism, and its application to decentralized machine learning inference through spML. Our protocol has a pure strategy Nash Equilibrium, compelling rational participants to act honestly. It economically disincentivizes dishonest behavior, making it costly for participants to compromise the network's integrity. In our spML protocol, we apply PoSP to decentralized inference for AI applications via a novel cryptographic protocol. The resulting protocol is much more efficient than zero knowledge proof based approaches. Moreover, we anticipate that the PoSP protocol could be effectively utilized for designing verification mechanisms within Actively Validated Services (AVS) in restaking solutions. We further expect that the PoSP protocol could be applied to a variety of other decentralized applications. Our approach enhances the reliability and efficiency of decentralized systems, paving the way for a new generation of decentralized applications.
format Preprint
id arxiv_https___arxiv_org_abs_2405_00295
institution arXiv
publishDate 2024
record_format arxiv
spellingShingle Proof of Sampling: A Nash Equilibrium-Based Verification Protocol for Decentralized Systems
Zhang, Yue
Wang, Shouqiao
Tan, Sijun
Liu, Xiaoyuan
Moallemi, Ciamac C.
Popa, Raluca Ada
Computer Science and Game Theory
This paper introduces the Proof of Sampling (PoSP) protocol, a Nash Equilibrium-based verification mechanism, and its application to decentralized machine learning inference through spML. Our protocol has a pure strategy Nash Equilibrium, compelling rational participants to act honestly. It economically disincentivizes dishonest behavior, making it costly for participants to compromise the network's integrity. In our spML protocol, we apply PoSP to decentralized inference for AI applications via a novel cryptographic protocol. The resulting protocol is much more efficient than zero knowledge proof based approaches. Moreover, we anticipate that the PoSP protocol could be effectively utilized for designing verification mechanisms within Actively Validated Services (AVS) in restaking solutions. We further expect that the PoSP protocol could be applied to a variety of other decentralized applications. Our approach enhances the reliability and efficiency of decentralized systems, paving the way for a new generation of decentralized applications.
title Proof of Sampling: A Nash Equilibrium-Based Verification Protocol for Decentralized Systems
topic Computer Science and Game Theory
url https://arxiv.org/abs/2405.00295