Optimizing Profitability in Timely Gossip Networks
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arXiv
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| Autores principales: | , , , , |
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| Formato: | Preprint |
| Publicado: |
2024
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| Acceso en línea: | |
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| _version_ | 1866913338316816384 |
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| author | Kaswan, Priyanka Bastopcu, Melih Ulukus, Sennur Etesami, S. Rasoul Başar, Tamer |
| author_facet | Kaswan, Priyanka Bastopcu, Melih Ulukus, Sennur Etesami, S. Rasoul Başar, Tamer |
| contents | We consider a communication system where a group of users, interconnected in a bidirectional gossip network, wishes to follow a time-varying source, e.g., updates on an event, in real-time. The users wish to maintain their expected version ages below a threshold, and can either rely on gossip from their neighbors or directly subscribe to a server publishing about the event, if the former option does not meet the timeliness requirements. The server wishes to maximize its profit by increasing subscriptions from users and minimizing event sampling frequency to reduce costs. This leads to a Stackelberg game between the server and the users where the sender is the leader deciding its sampling frequency and the users are the followers deciding their subscription strategies. We investigate equilibrium strategies for low-connectivity and high-connectivity topologies. |
| format | Preprint |
| id |
arxiv_https___arxiv_org_abs_2405_00665 |
| institution | arXiv |
| publishDate | 2024 |
| record_format | arxiv |
| spellingShingle | Optimizing Profitability in Timely Gossip Networks Kaswan, Priyanka Bastopcu, Melih Ulukus, Sennur Etesami, S. Rasoul Başar, Tamer Information Theory Networking and Internet Architecture Signal Processing We consider a communication system where a group of users, interconnected in a bidirectional gossip network, wishes to follow a time-varying source, e.g., updates on an event, in real-time. The users wish to maintain their expected version ages below a threshold, and can either rely on gossip from their neighbors or directly subscribe to a server publishing about the event, if the former option does not meet the timeliness requirements. The server wishes to maximize its profit by increasing subscriptions from users and minimizing event sampling frequency to reduce costs. This leads to a Stackelberg game between the server and the users where the sender is the leader deciding its sampling frequency and the users are the followers deciding their subscription strategies. We investigate equilibrium strategies for low-connectivity and high-connectivity topologies. |
| title | Optimizing Profitability in Timely Gossip Networks |
| topic | Information Theory Networking and Internet Architecture Signal Processing |
| url | https://arxiv.org/abs/2405.00665 |