Algorithmic collusion in a two-sided market: A rideshare example
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arXiv
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| Autori principali: | , |
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| Natura: | Preprint |
| Pubblicazione: |
2024
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| _version_ | 1866910664615788544 |
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| author | Koirala, Pravesh Laine, Forrest |
| author_facet | Koirala, Pravesh Laine, Forrest |
| contents | With dynamic pricing on the rise, firms are using sophisticated algorithms for price determination. These algorithms are often non-interpretable and there has been a recent interest in their seemingly emergent ability to tacitly collude with each other without any prior communication whatsoever. Most of the previous works investigate algorithmic collusion on simple reinforcement learning (RL) based algorithms operating on a basic market model. Instead, we explore the collusive tendencies of Proximal Policy Optimization (PPO), a state-of-the-art continuous state/action space RL algorithm, on a complex double-sided hierarchical market model of rideshare. For this purpose, we extend a mathematical program network (MPN) based rideshare model to a temporal multi origin-destination setting and use PPO to solve for a repeated duopoly game. Our results indicate that PPO can either converge to a competitive or a collusive equilibrium depending upon the underlying market characteristics, even when the hyper-parameters are held constant. |
| format | Preprint |
| id |
arxiv_https___arxiv_org_abs_2405_02835 |
| institution | arXiv |
| publishDate | 2024 |
| record_format | arxiv |
| spellingShingle | Algorithmic collusion in a two-sided market: A rideshare example Koirala, Pravesh Laine, Forrest Computer Science and Game Theory Multiagent Systems With dynamic pricing on the rise, firms are using sophisticated algorithms for price determination. These algorithms are often non-interpretable and there has been a recent interest in their seemingly emergent ability to tacitly collude with each other without any prior communication whatsoever. Most of the previous works investigate algorithmic collusion on simple reinforcement learning (RL) based algorithms operating on a basic market model. Instead, we explore the collusive tendencies of Proximal Policy Optimization (PPO), a state-of-the-art continuous state/action space RL algorithm, on a complex double-sided hierarchical market model of rideshare. For this purpose, we extend a mathematical program network (MPN) based rideshare model to a temporal multi origin-destination setting and use PPO to solve for a repeated duopoly game. Our results indicate that PPO can either converge to a competitive or a collusive equilibrium depending upon the underlying market characteristics, even when the hyper-parameters are held constant. |
| title | Algorithmic collusion in a two-sided market: A rideshare example |
| topic | Computer Science and Game Theory Multiagent Systems |
| url | https://arxiv.org/abs/2405.02835 |