SmmPack: Obfuscation for SMM Modules with TPM Sealed Key
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arXiv
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| Main Authors: | , , , , |
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| Format: | Preprint |
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2024
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| _version_ | 1866910439204454400 |
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| author | Matsuo, Kazuki Tanda, Satoshi Suzaki, Kuniyasu Kawakoya, Yuhei Mori, Tatsuya |
| author_facet | Matsuo, Kazuki Tanda, Satoshi Suzaki, Kuniyasu Kawakoya, Yuhei Mori, Tatsuya |
| contents | System Management Mode (SMM) is the highest-privileged operating mode of x86 and x86-64 processors. Through SMM exploitation, attackers can tamper with the Unified Extensible Firmware Interface (UEFI) firmware, disabling the security mechanisms implemented by the operating system and hypervisor. Vulnerabilities enabling SMM code execution are often reported as Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures (CVEs); however, no security mechanisms currently exist to prevent attackers from analyzing those vulnerabilities. To increase the cost of vulnerability analysis of SMM modules, we introduced SmmPack. The core concept of SmmPack involves encrypting an SMM module with the key securely stored in a Trusted Platform Module (TPM). We assessed the effectiveness of SmmPack in preventing attackers from obtaining and analyzing SMM modules using various acquisition methods. Our results show that SmmPack significantly increases the cost by narrowing down the means of module acquisition. Furthermore, we demonstrated that SmmPack operates without compromising the performance of the original SMM modules. We also clarified the management and adoption methods of SmmPack, as well as the procedure for applying BIOS updates, and demonstrated that the implementation of SmmPack is realistic. |
| format | Preprint |
| id |
arxiv_https___arxiv_org_abs_2405_04355 |
| institution | arXiv |
| publishDate | 2024 |
| record_format | arxiv |
| spellingShingle | SmmPack: Obfuscation for SMM Modules with TPM Sealed Key Matsuo, Kazuki Tanda, Satoshi Suzaki, Kuniyasu Kawakoya, Yuhei Mori, Tatsuya Cryptography and Security System Management Mode (SMM) is the highest-privileged operating mode of x86 and x86-64 processors. Through SMM exploitation, attackers can tamper with the Unified Extensible Firmware Interface (UEFI) firmware, disabling the security mechanisms implemented by the operating system and hypervisor. Vulnerabilities enabling SMM code execution are often reported as Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures (CVEs); however, no security mechanisms currently exist to prevent attackers from analyzing those vulnerabilities. To increase the cost of vulnerability analysis of SMM modules, we introduced SmmPack. The core concept of SmmPack involves encrypting an SMM module with the key securely stored in a Trusted Platform Module (TPM). We assessed the effectiveness of SmmPack in preventing attackers from obtaining and analyzing SMM modules using various acquisition methods. Our results show that SmmPack significantly increases the cost by narrowing down the means of module acquisition. Furthermore, we demonstrated that SmmPack operates without compromising the performance of the original SMM modules. We also clarified the management and adoption methods of SmmPack, as well as the procedure for applying BIOS updates, and demonstrated that the implementation of SmmPack is realistic. |
| title | SmmPack: Obfuscation for SMM Modules with TPM Sealed Key |
| topic | Cryptography and Security |
| url | https://arxiv.org/abs/2405.04355 |