Systematic Use of Random Self-Reducibility against Physical Attacks
Fuente:
arXiv
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| Autori principali: | , , , , , , , , , |
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| Natura: | Preprint |
| Pubblicazione: |
2024
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| Soggetti: | |
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| _version_ | 1866909195682447360 |
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| author | Erata, Ferhat Chiu, TingHung Etim, Anthony Nampally, Srilalith Raju, Tejas Ramu, Rajashree Piskac, Ruzica Antonopoulos, Timos Xiong, Wenjie Szefer, Jakub |
| author_facet | Erata, Ferhat Chiu, TingHung Etim, Anthony Nampally, Srilalith Raju, Tejas Ramu, Rajashree Piskac, Ruzica Antonopoulos, Timos Xiong, Wenjie Szefer, Jakub |
| contents | This work presents a novel, black-box software-based countermeasure against physical attacks including power side-channel and fault-injection attacks. The approach uses the concept of random self-reducibility and self-correctness to add randomness and redundancy in the execution for protection. Our approach is at the operation level, is not algorithm-specific, and thus, can be applied for protecting a wide range of algorithms. The countermeasure is empirically evaluated against attacks over operations like modular exponentiation, modular multiplication, polynomial multiplication, and number theoretic transforms. An end-to-end implementation of this countermeasure is demonstrated for RSA-CRT signature algorithm and Kyber Key Generation public key cryptosystems. The countermeasure reduced the power side-channel leakage by two orders of magnitude, to an acceptably secure level in TVLA analysis. For fault injection, the countermeasure reduces the number of faults to 95.4% in average. |
| format | Preprint |
| id |
arxiv_https___arxiv_org_abs_2405_05193 |
| institution | arXiv |
| publishDate | 2024 |
| record_format | arxiv |
| spellingShingle | Systematic Use of Random Self-Reducibility against Physical Attacks Erata, Ferhat Chiu, TingHung Etim, Anthony Nampally, Srilalith Raju, Tejas Ramu, Rajashree Piskac, Ruzica Antonopoulos, Timos Xiong, Wenjie Szefer, Jakub Cryptography and Security This work presents a novel, black-box software-based countermeasure against physical attacks including power side-channel and fault-injection attacks. The approach uses the concept of random self-reducibility and self-correctness to add randomness and redundancy in the execution for protection. Our approach is at the operation level, is not algorithm-specific, and thus, can be applied for protecting a wide range of algorithms. The countermeasure is empirically evaluated against attacks over operations like modular exponentiation, modular multiplication, polynomial multiplication, and number theoretic transforms. An end-to-end implementation of this countermeasure is demonstrated for RSA-CRT signature algorithm and Kyber Key Generation public key cryptosystems. The countermeasure reduced the power side-channel leakage by two orders of magnitude, to an acceptably secure level in TVLA analysis. For fault injection, the countermeasure reduces the number of faults to 95.4% in average. |
| title | Systematic Use of Random Self-Reducibility against Physical Attacks |
| topic | Cryptography and Security |
| url | https://arxiv.org/abs/2405.05193 |