Impedance vs. Power Side-channel Vulnerabilities: A Comparative Study
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arXiv
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| Format: | Preprint |
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2024
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| _version_ | 1866917791502696448 |
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| author | Awal, Md Sadik Gayanath, Buddhipriya Rahman, Md Tauhidur |
| author_facet | Awal, Md Sadik Gayanath, Buddhipriya Rahman, Md Tauhidur |
| contents | Physical side channels emerge from the relation between internal computation or data with observable physical parameters of a chip. Previous works mostly focus on properties related to current consumption such as power consumption. The fundamental property behind current consumption occur from the impedance of the chip. Contemporary works have stared using chip impedance as a physical side channel in extracting sensitive information from computing systems. It leverages variations in intrinsic impedance of a chip across different logic states. However, there has been a lack of comparative studies. In this study, we conduct a comparative analysis of the impedance side channel, which has been limitedly explored, and the well-established power side channel. Through experimental evaluation, we investigate the efficacy of these side channels in extracting stored advanced encryption standard (AES) cryptographic key on a memory and analyze their performance. Our findings indicate that impedance analysis demonstrates a higher potential for cryptographic key extraction compared to power side-channel analysis (SCA). Moreover, we identify scenarios where power SCA does not yield satisfactory results, whereas impedance analysis proves to be more robust and effective. This work not only underscores the significance of impedance SCA in enhancing cryptographic security but also emphasizes the necessity for a deeper understanding of its mechanisms and implications. |
| format | Preprint |
| id |
arxiv_https___arxiv_org_abs_2405_06242 |
| institution | arXiv |
| publishDate | 2024 |
| record_format | arxiv |
| spellingShingle | Impedance vs. Power Side-channel Vulnerabilities: A Comparative Study Awal, Md Sadik Gayanath, Buddhipriya Rahman, Md Tauhidur Cryptography and Security Information Retrieval Physical side channels emerge from the relation between internal computation or data with observable physical parameters of a chip. Previous works mostly focus on properties related to current consumption such as power consumption. The fundamental property behind current consumption occur from the impedance of the chip. Contemporary works have stared using chip impedance as a physical side channel in extracting sensitive information from computing systems. It leverages variations in intrinsic impedance of a chip across different logic states. However, there has been a lack of comparative studies. In this study, we conduct a comparative analysis of the impedance side channel, which has been limitedly explored, and the well-established power side channel. Through experimental evaluation, we investigate the efficacy of these side channels in extracting stored advanced encryption standard (AES) cryptographic key on a memory and analyze their performance. Our findings indicate that impedance analysis demonstrates a higher potential for cryptographic key extraction compared to power side-channel analysis (SCA). Moreover, we identify scenarios where power SCA does not yield satisfactory results, whereas impedance analysis proves to be more robust and effective. This work not only underscores the significance of impedance SCA in enhancing cryptographic security but also emphasizes the necessity for a deeper understanding of its mechanisms and implications. |
| title | Impedance vs. Power Side-channel Vulnerabilities: A Comparative Study |
| topic | Cryptography and Security Information Retrieval |
| url | https://arxiv.org/abs/2405.06242 |