Towards Browser Controls to Protect Cookies from Malicious Extensions
Fuente:
arXiv
Gespeichert in:
| Hauptverfasser: | , |
|---|---|
| Format: | Preprint |
| Veröffentlicht: |
2024
|
| Schlagworte: | |
| Online-Zugang: | |
| Tags: |
Tag hinzufügen
Keine Tags, Fügen Sie den ersten Tag hinzu!
|
| _version_ | 1866911067257438208 |
|---|---|
| author | Tyler, Liam Nunes, Ivan De Oliveira |
| author_facet | Tyler, Liam Nunes, Ivan De Oliveira |
| contents | Cookies maintain state across related web traffic. As such, cookies are commonly used for authentication by storing a user's session ID and replacing the need to re-enter credentials in subsequent traffic. These so-called ``session cookies'' are prime targets for attacks that aim to steal them to gain unauthorized access to user accounts. To mitigate these attacks, the Secure and HttpOnly cookie attributes limit a cookie's accessibility from malicious networks and websites. However, these controls overlook browser extensions: third-party HTML/JavaScript add-ons with access to privileged browser APIs and the ability to operate across multiple websites. Thus malicious or compromised extensions can provide unrestricted access to a user's session cookies.
In this work, we first analyze the prevalence of extensions with access to ``risky'' APIs (those that enable cookie modification and theft) and find that they have hundreds of millions of users. Motivated by this, we propose a mechanism to protect cookies from malicious extensions by introducing two new cookie attributes: BrowserOnly and Monitored. The BrowserOnly attribute prevents extension access to cookies altogether. While effective, not all cookies can be made inaccessible. Thus cookies with the Monitored attribute remain accessible but are tied to a single browser and any changes made to the cookie are logged. As a result, stolen Monitored cookies are unusable outside their original browser and servers can validate the modifications performed. To demonstrate the proposed functionalities, we design and implement CREAM (Cookie Restrictions for Extension Abuse Mitigation) a modified version of the open-source Chromium browser realizing these controls. Our evaluation indicates that CREAM effectively protects cookies from malicious extensions while incurring little run-time overheads. |
| format | Preprint |
| id |
arxiv_https___arxiv_org_abs_2405_06830 |
| institution | arXiv |
| publishDate | 2024 |
| record_format | arxiv |
| spellingShingle | Towards Browser Controls to Protect Cookies from Malicious Extensions Tyler, Liam Nunes, Ivan De Oliveira Cryptography and Security Cookies maintain state across related web traffic. As such, cookies are commonly used for authentication by storing a user's session ID and replacing the need to re-enter credentials in subsequent traffic. These so-called ``session cookies'' are prime targets for attacks that aim to steal them to gain unauthorized access to user accounts. To mitigate these attacks, the Secure and HttpOnly cookie attributes limit a cookie's accessibility from malicious networks and websites. However, these controls overlook browser extensions: third-party HTML/JavaScript add-ons with access to privileged browser APIs and the ability to operate across multiple websites. Thus malicious or compromised extensions can provide unrestricted access to a user's session cookies. In this work, we first analyze the prevalence of extensions with access to ``risky'' APIs (those that enable cookie modification and theft) and find that they have hundreds of millions of users. Motivated by this, we propose a mechanism to protect cookies from malicious extensions by introducing two new cookie attributes: BrowserOnly and Monitored. The BrowserOnly attribute prevents extension access to cookies altogether. While effective, not all cookies can be made inaccessible. Thus cookies with the Monitored attribute remain accessible but are tied to a single browser and any changes made to the cookie are logged. As a result, stolen Monitored cookies are unusable outside their original browser and servers can validate the modifications performed. To demonstrate the proposed functionalities, we design and implement CREAM (Cookie Restrictions for Extension Abuse Mitigation) a modified version of the open-source Chromium browser realizing these controls. Our evaluation indicates that CREAM effectively protects cookies from malicious extensions while incurring little run-time overheads. |
| title | Towards Browser Controls to Protect Cookies from Malicious Extensions |
| topic | Cryptography and Security |
| url | https://arxiv.org/abs/2405.06830 |