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Détails bibliographiques
Auteurs principaux:	Galichon, Alfred, Jacquet, Antoine
Format:	Preprint
Publié:	2024
Sujets:	Theoretical Economics Computer Science and Game Theory
Accès en ligne:	https://arxiv.org/abs/2405.07628
Tags:	Ajouter un tag Pas de tags, Soyez le premier à ajouter un tag!

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