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| Autores principales: | , , , , |
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| Formato: | Preprint |
| Publicado: |
2024
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| Materias: | |
| Acceso en línea: | https://arxiv.org/abs/2405.09356 |
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| _version_ | 1866911877241503744 |
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| author | Bustamante-Faúndez, Pamela L., Víctor Bucarey Labbé, Martine Marianov, Vladimir Ordóñez, Fernando |
| author_facet | Bustamante-Faúndez, Pamela L., Víctor Bucarey Labbé, Martine Marianov, Vladimir Ordóñez, Fernando |
| contents | Anticipating the strategies of potential attackers is crucial for protecting critical infrastructure. We can represent the challenge of the defenders of such infrastructure as a Stackelberg security game. The defender must decide how to allocate limited resources to protect specific targets, aiming to maximize their expected utility (such as minimizing the extent of damage) and considering that attackers will respond in a way that is most advantageous to them.
We present novel valid inequalities to find a Strong Stackelberg Equilibrium in both Stackelberg games and Stackelberg security games. We also consider a Stackelberg security game that aims to protect targets with a defined budget. We use branch-and-price in this game to show that our approach outperforms the standard formulation in the literature, and we conduct an extensive computational study to analyze the impact of various branch-and-price parameters on the performance of our method in different game settings. |
| format | Preprint |
| id |
arxiv_https___arxiv_org_abs_2405_09356 |
| institution | arXiv |
| publishDate | 2024 |
| record_format | arxiv |
| spellingShingle | Branch-and-price with novel cuts, and a new Stackelberg Security Game Bustamante-Faúndez, Pamela L., Víctor Bucarey Labbé, Martine Marianov, Vladimir Ordóñez, Fernando Computer Science and Game Theory Optimization and Control Anticipating the strategies of potential attackers is crucial for protecting critical infrastructure. We can represent the challenge of the defenders of such infrastructure as a Stackelberg security game. The defender must decide how to allocate limited resources to protect specific targets, aiming to maximize their expected utility (such as minimizing the extent of damage) and considering that attackers will respond in a way that is most advantageous to them. We present novel valid inequalities to find a Strong Stackelberg Equilibrium in both Stackelberg games and Stackelberg security games. We also consider a Stackelberg security game that aims to protect targets with a defined budget. We use branch-and-price in this game to show that our approach outperforms the standard formulation in the literature, and we conduct an extensive computational study to analyze the impact of various branch-and-price parameters on the performance of our method in different game settings. |
| title | Branch-and-price with novel cuts, and a new Stackelberg Security Game |
| topic | Computer Science and Game Theory Optimization and Control |
| url | https://arxiv.org/abs/2405.09356 |