Mellivora Capensis: A Backdoor-Free Training Framework on the Poisoned Dataset without Auxiliary Data
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arXiv
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| Main Authors: | , , , , , , |
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| Format: | Preprint |
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2024
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| _version_ | 1866911163866939392 |
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| author | Pu, Yuwen Chen, Jiahao Zhou, Chunyi Feng, Zhou Li, Qingming Hu, Chunqiang Ji, Shouling |
| author_facet | Pu, Yuwen Chen, Jiahao Zhou, Chunyi Feng, Zhou Li, Qingming Hu, Chunqiang Ji, Shouling |
| contents | The efficacy of deep learning models is profoundly influenced by the quality of their training data. Given the considerations of data diversity, data scale, and annotation expenses, model trainers frequently resort to sourcing and acquiring datasets from online repositories. Although economically pragmatic, this strategy exposes the models to substantial security vulnerabilities. Untrusted entities can clandestinely embed triggers within the dataset, facilitating the hijacking of the trained model on the poisoned dataset through backdoor attacks, which constitutes a grave security concern. Despite the proliferation of countermeasure research, their inherent limitations constrain their effectiveness in practical applications. These include the requirement for substantial quantities of clean samples, inconsistent defense performance across varying attack scenarios, and inadequate resilience against adaptive attacks, among others. Therefore, in this paper, we endeavor to address the challenges of backdoor attack countermeasures in real-world scenarios, thereby fortifying the security of training paradigm under the data-collection manner. Concretely, we first explore the inherent relationship between the potential perturbations and the backdoor trigger, and demonstrate the key observation that the poisoned samples perform more robustness to perturbation than the clean ones through the theoretical analysis and experiments. Then, based on our key explorations, we propose a robust and clean-data-free backdoor defense framework, namely Mellivora Capensis (\texttt{MeCa}), which enables the model trainer to train a clean model on the poisoned dataset. |
| format | Preprint |
| id |
arxiv_https___arxiv_org_abs_2405_12719 |
| institution | arXiv |
| publishDate | 2024 |
| record_format | arxiv |
| spellingShingle | Mellivora Capensis: A Backdoor-Free Training Framework on the Poisoned Dataset without Auxiliary Data Pu, Yuwen Chen, Jiahao Zhou, Chunyi Feng, Zhou Li, Qingming Hu, Chunqiang Ji, Shouling Cryptography and Security The efficacy of deep learning models is profoundly influenced by the quality of their training data. Given the considerations of data diversity, data scale, and annotation expenses, model trainers frequently resort to sourcing and acquiring datasets from online repositories. Although economically pragmatic, this strategy exposes the models to substantial security vulnerabilities. Untrusted entities can clandestinely embed triggers within the dataset, facilitating the hijacking of the trained model on the poisoned dataset through backdoor attacks, which constitutes a grave security concern. Despite the proliferation of countermeasure research, their inherent limitations constrain their effectiveness in practical applications. These include the requirement for substantial quantities of clean samples, inconsistent defense performance across varying attack scenarios, and inadequate resilience against adaptive attacks, among others. Therefore, in this paper, we endeavor to address the challenges of backdoor attack countermeasures in real-world scenarios, thereby fortifying the security of training paradigm under the data-collection manner. Concretely, we first explore the inherent relationship between the potential perturbations and the backdoor trigger, and demonstrate the key observation that the poisoned samples perform more robustness to perturbation than the clean ones through the theoretical analysis and experiments. Then, based on our key explorations, we propose a robust and clean-data-free backdoor defense framework, namely Mellivora Capensis (\texttt{MeCa}), which enables the model trainer to train a clean model on the poisoned dataset. |
| title | Mellivora Capensis: A Backdoor-Free Training Framework on the Poisoned Dataset without Auxiliary Data |
| topic | Cryptography and Security |
| url | https://arxiv.org/abs/2405.12719 |