Nearest is Not Dearest: Towards Practical Defense against Quantization-conditioned Backdoor Attacks
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arXiv
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| Main Authors: | , , , , , |
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| Format: | Preprint |
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2024
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| _version_ | 1866910454396223488 |
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| author | Li, Boheng Cai, Yishuo Li, Haowei Xue, Feng Li, Zhifeng Li, Yiming |
| author_facet | Li, Boheng Cai, Yishuo Li, Haowei Xue, Feng Li, Zhifeng Li, Yiming |
| contents | Model quantization is widely used to compress and accelerate deep neural networks. However, recent studies have revealed the feasibility of weaponizing model quantization via implanting quantization-conditioned backdoors (QCBs). These special backdoors stay dormant on released full-precision models but will come into effect after standard quantization. Due to the peculiarity of QCBs, existing defenses have minor effects on reducing their threats or are even infeasible. In this paper, we conduct the first in-depth analysis of QCBs. We reveal that the activation of existing QCBs primarily stems from the nearest rounding operation and is closely related to the norms of neuron-wise truncation errors (i.e., the difference between the continuous full-precision weights and its quantized version). Motivated by these insights, we propose Error-guided Flipped Rounding with Activation Preservation (EFRAP), an effective and practical defense against QCBs. Specifically, EFRAP learns a non-nearest rounding strategy with neuron-wise error norm and layer-wise activation preservation guidance, flipping the rounding strategies of neurons crucial for backdoor effects but with minimal impact on clean accuracy. Extensive evaluations on benchmark datasets demonstrate that our EFRAP can defeat state-of-the-art QCB attacks under various settings. Code is available at https://github.com/AntigoneRandy/QuantBackdoor_EFRAP. |
| format | Preprint |
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arxiv_https___arxiv_org_abs_2405_12725 |
| institution | arXiv |
| publishDate | 2024 |
| record_format | arxiv |
| spellingShingle | Nearest is Not Dearest: Towards Practical Defense against Quantization-conditioned Backdoor Attacks Li, Boheng Cai, Yishuo Li, Haowei Xue, Feng Li, Zhifeng Li, Yiming Cryptography and Security Computer Vision and Pattern Recognition Model quantization is widely used to compress and accelerate deep neural networks. However, recent studies have revealed the feasibility of weaponizing model quantization via implanting quantization-conditioned backdoors (QCBs). These special backdoors stay dormant on released full-precision models but will come into effect after standard quantization. Due to the peculiarity of QCBs, existing defenses have minor effects on reducing their threats or are even infeasible. In this paper, we conduct the first in-depth analysis of QCBs. We reveal that the activation of existing QCBs primarily stems from the nearest rounding operation and is closely related to the norms of neuron-wise truncation errors (i.e., the difference between the continuous full-precision weights and its quantized version). Motivated by these insights, we propose Error-guided Flipped Rounding with Activation Preservation (EFRAP), an effective and practical defense against QCBs. Specifically, EFRAP learns a non-nearest rounding strategy with neuron-wise error norm and layer-wise activation preservation guidance, flipping the rounding strategies of neurons crucial for backdoor effects but with minimal impact on clean accuracy. Extensive evaluations on benchmark datasets demonstrate that our EFRAP can defeat state-of-the-art QCB attacks under various settings. Code is available at https://github.com/AntigoneRandy/QuantBackdoor_EFRAP. |
| title | Nearest is Not Dearest: Towards Practical Defense against Quantization-conditioned Backdoor Attacks |
| topic | Cryptography and Security Computer Vision and Pattern Recognition |
| url | https://arxiv.org/abs/2405.12725 |