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The Machiavellian frontier of stable mechanisms

Fuente: arXiv

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Détails bibliographiques
Auteurs principaux:	Chen, Qiufu, Li, Yuanmei, Yin, Xiaopeng, Zhang, Luosai, Zhou, Siyi
Format:	Preprint
Publié:	2024
Sujets:	Theoretical Economics
Accès en ligne:	Acceder al recurso
Tags:	Ajouter un tag Pas de tags, Soyez le premier à ajouter un tag!

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