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FACT or Fiction: Can Truthful Mechanisms Eliminate Federated Free Riding?

Fuente: arXiv

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Détails bibliographiques
Auteurs principaux:	Bornstein, Marco, Bedi, Amrit Singh, Mohamed, Abdirisak, Huang, Furong
Format:	Preprint
Publié:	2024
Sujets:	Computer Science and Game Theory Distributed, Parallel, and Cluster Computing Machine Learning Theoretical Economics
Accès en ligne:	Acceder al recurso
Tags:	Ajouter un tag Pas de tags, Soyez le premier à ajouter un tag!

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