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Optimized Cost Per Click in Online Advertising: A Theoretical Analysis

Fuente: arXiv

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Détails bibliographiques
Auteurs principaux:	Zhang, Kaichen, Yuan, Zixuan, Xiong, Hui
Format:	Preprint
Publié:	2024
Sujets:	Computer Science and Game Theory Theoretical Economics
Accès en ligne:	Acceder al recurso
Tags:	Ajouter un tag Pas de tags, Soyez le premier à ajouter un tag!

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