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Sybil-Proof Mechanism for Information Propagation with Budgets

Fuente: arXiv

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Détails bibliographiques
Auteurs principaux:	Zheng, Junjie, Ge, Xu, Li, Bin, Zhao, Dengji
Format:	Preprint
Publié:	2024
Sujets:	Computer Science and Game Theory
Accès en ligne:	Acceder al recurso
Tags:	Ajouter un tag Pas de tags, Soyez le premier à ajouter un tag!

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