Cover Image

Axioms for AI Alignment from Human Feedback

Fuente: arXiv

Saved in:

Bibliographic Details
Main Authors:	Ge, Luise, Halpern, Daniel, Micha, Evi, Procaccia, Ariel D., Shapira, Itai, Vorobeychik, Yevgeniy, Wu, Junlin
Format:	Preprint
Published:	2024
Subjects:	Computer Science and Game Theory Artificial Intelligence Machine Learning
Online Access:	Acceder al recurso
Tags:	Add Tag No Tags, Be the first to tag this record!

Similar Items

Linear Social Choice with Few Queries: A Moment-Based Approach
by: Ge, Luise, et al.
Published: (2026)

Optimized Distortion in Linear Social Choice
by: Ge, Luise, et al.
Published: (2025)

Pairwise Calibrated Rewards for Pluralistic Alignment
by: Halpern, Daniel, et al.
Published: (2025)

Computing Voting Rules with Improvement Feedback
by: Micha, Evi, et al.
Published: (2025)

Strategic Classification With Externalities
by: Hossain, Safwan, et al.
Published: (2024)

Clone-Robust AI Alignment
by: Procaccia, Ariel D., et al.
Published: (2025)

Temporal Panel Selection in Ongoing Citizens' Assemblies
by: Kalayci, Yusuf Hakan, et al.
Published: (2026)

Incentives in Federated Learning with Heterogeneous Agents
by: Procaccia, Ariel D., et al.
Published: (2025)

Generative Social Choice
by: Fish, Sara, et al.
Published: (2023)

Bias Detection Via Signaling
by: Chen, Yiling, et al.
Published: (2024)

Proportional Fairness in Non-Centroid Clustering
by: Caragiannis, Ioannis, et al.
Published: (2024)

Learning Social Welfare Functions
by: Pardeshi, Kanad Shrikar, et al.
Published: (2024)

The Proportional Veto Principle for Approval Ballots
by: Halpern, Daniel, et al.
Published: (2025)

Generative Social Choice: The Next Generation
by: Boehmer, Niclas, et al.
Published: (2025)

Policy Aggregation
by: Alamdari, Parand A., et al.
Published: (2024)

Group Fairness in Peer Review
by: Aziz, Haris, et al.
Published: (2024)

Adaptive Contracts for Cost-Effective AI Delegation
by: Saig, Eden, et al.
Published: (2026)

CyGym: A Simulation-Based Game-Theoretic Analysis Framework for Cybersecurity
by: Lanier, Michael, et al.
Published: (2025)

Boosting Sortition via Proportional Representation
by: Ebadian, Soroush, et al.
Published: (2024)

Alternates, Assemble! Selecting Optimal Alternates for Citizens' Assemblies
by: Assos, Angelos, et al.
Published: (2025)

Finding Common Ground in a Sea of Alternatives
by: Chooi, Jay, et al.
Published: (2026)

Computing Voting Rules with Elicited Incomplete Votes
by: Halpern, Daniel, et al.
Published: (2024)

Federated Assemblies
by: Halpern, Daniel, et al.
Published: (2024)

Can a Few Decide for Many? The Metric Distortion of Sortition
by: Caragiannis, Ioannis, et al.
Published: (2024)

Learning Recommender Mechanisms for Bayesian Stochastic Games
by: Guresti, Bengisu, et al.
Published: (2025)

What is Best for Students, Numerical Scores or Letter Grades?
by: Micha, Evi, et al.
Published: (2024)

Tracking Truth with Liquid Democracy
by: Berinsky, Adam, et al.
Published: (2021)

Online Learning from Strategic Human Feedback in LLM Fine-Tuning
by: Hao, Shugang, et al.
Published: (2024)

Human Misperception of Generative-AI Alignment: A Laboratory Experiment
by: He, Kevin, et al.
Published: (2025)

Human Choice Prediction in Language-based Persuasion Games: Simulation-based Off-Policy Evaluation
by: Shapira, Eilam, et al.
Published: (2023)

Is Four Enough? Automated Reasoning Approaches and Dual Bounds for Condorcet Dimensions of Elections
by: Zilberstein, Itai, et al.
Published: (2026)

Individual Representation in Approval-Based Committee Voting
by: Brill, Markus, et al.
Published: (2021)

Rationality of Learning Algorithms in Repeated Normal-Form Games
by: Bajaj, Shivam, et al.
Published: (2024)

To Give or Not to Give? The Impacts of Strategically Withheld Recourse
by: Chen, Yatong, et al.
Published: (2025)

Multi-Apartment Rent Division
by: Procaccia, Ariel D., et al.
Published: (2024)

In This Apportionment Lottery, the House Always Wins
by: Gölz, Paul, et al.
Published: (2022)

The Poisoned Apple Effect: Strategic Manipulation of Mediated Markets via Technology Expansion of AI Agents
by: Shapira, Eilam, et al.
Published: (2026)

The Battling Influencers Game: Nash Equilibria Structure of a Potential Game and Implications to Value Alignment
by: Wu, Young, et al.
Published: (2025)

On Corrigibility and Alignment in Multi Agent Games
by: Dable-Heath, Edmund, et al.
Published: (2025)

A Revealed Preference Framework for AI Alignment
by: Suleymanov, Elchin
Published: (2026)