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Auteurs principaux: Fu, Yu, Xiao, Wen, Chen, Jia, Li, Jiachen, Papalexakis, Evangelos, Chien, Aichi, Dong, Yue
Format: Preprint
Publié: 2024
Sujets:
Accès en ligne:https://arxiv.org/abs/2405.15202
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author Fu, Yu
Xiao, Wen
Chen, Jia
Li, Jiachen
Papalexakis, Evangelos
Chien, Aichi
Dong, Yue
author_facet Fu, Yu
Xiao, Wen
Chen, Jia
Li, Jiachen
Papalexakis, Evangelos
Chien, Aichi
Dong, Yue
contents Recent studies reveal that Large Language Models (LLMs) face challenges in balancing safety with utility, particularly when processing long texts for NLP tasks like summarization and translation. Despite defenses against malicious short questions, the ability of LLMs to safely handle dangerous long content, such as manuals teaching illicit activities, remains unclear. Our work aims to develop robust defenses for LLMs in processing malicious documents alongside benign NLP task queries. We introduce a defense dataset comprised of safety-related examples and propose single-task and mixed-task losses for instruction tuning. Our empirical results demonstrate that LLMs can significantly enhance their capacity to safely manage dangerous content with appropriate instruction tuning. Additionally, strengthening the defenses of tasks most susceptible to misuse is effective in protecting LLMs against processing harmful information. We also observe that trade-offs between utility and safety exist in defense strategies, where Llama2, utilizing our proposed approach, displays a significantly better balance compared to Llama1.
format Preprint
id arxiv_https___arxiv_org_abs_2405_15202
institution arXiv
publishDate 2024
record_format arxiv
spellingShingle Cross-Task Defense: Instruction-Tuning LLMs for Content Safety
Fu, Yu
Xiao, Wen
Chen, Jia
Li, Jiachen
Papalexakis, Evangelos
Chien, Aichi
Dong, Yue
Computation and Language
Cryptography and Security
Recent studies reveal that Large Language Models (LLMs) face challenges in balancing safety with utility, particularly when processing long texts for NLP tasks like summarization and translation. Despite defenses against malicious short questions, the ability of LLMs to safely handle dangerous long content, such as manuals teaching illicit activities, remains unclear. Our work aims to develop robust defenses for LLMs in processing malicious documents alongside benign NLP task queries. We introduce a defense dataset comprised of safety-related examples and propose single-task and mixed-task losses for instruction tuning. Our empirical results demonstrate that LLMs can significantly enhance their capacity to safely manage dangerous content with appropriate instruction tuning. Additionally, strengthening the defenses of tasks most susceptible to misuse is effective in protecting LLMs against processing harmful information. We also observe that trade-offs between utility and safety exist in defense strategies, where Llama2, utilizing our proposed approach, displays a significantly better balance compared to Llama1.
title Cross-Task Defense: Instruction-Tuning LLMs for Content Safety
topic Computation and Language
Cryptography and Security
url https://arxiv.org/abs/2405.15202