Data Reconstruction: When You See It and When You Don't
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arXiv
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| Format: | Preprint |
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2024
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| _version_ | 1866909418761748480 |
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| author | Cohen, Edith Kaplan, Haim Mansour, Yishay Moran, Shay Nissim, Kobbi Stemmer, Uri Tsfadia, Eliad |
| author_facet | Cohen, Edith Kaplan, Haim Mansour, Yishay Moran, Shay Nissim, Kobbi Stemmer, Uri Tsfadia, Eliad |
| contents | We revisit the fundamental question of formally defining what constitutes a reconstruction attack. While often clear from the context, our exploration reveals that a precise definition is much more nuanced than it appears, to the extent that a single all-encompassing definition may not exist. Thus, we employ a different strategy and aim to "sandwich" the concept of reconstruction attacks by addressing two complementing questions: (i) What conditions guarantee that a given system is protected against such attacks? (ii) Under what circumstances does a given attack clearly indicate that a system is not protected? More specifically,
* We introduce a new definitional paradigm -- Narcissus Resiliency -- to formulate a security definition for protection against reconstruction attacks. This paradigm has a self-referential nature that enables it to circumvent shortcomings of previously studied notions of security. Furthermore, as a side-effect, we demonstrate that Narcissus resiliency captures as special cases multiple well-studied concepts including differential privacy and other security notions of one-way functions and encryption schemes.
* We formulate a link between reconstruction attacks and Kolmogorov complexity. This allows us to put forward a criterion for evaluating when such attacks are convincingly successful. |
| format | Preprint |
| id |
arxiv_https___arxiv_org_abs_2405_15753 |
| institution | arXiv |
| publishDate | 2024 |
| record_format | arxiv |
| spellingShingle | Data Reconstruction: When You See It and When You Don't Cohen, Edith Kaplan, Haim Mansour, Yishay Moran, Shay Nissim, Kobbi Stemmer, Uri Tsfadia, Eliad Cryptography and Security We revisit the fundamental question of formally defining what constitutes a reconstruction attack. While often clear from the context, our exploration reveals that a precise definition is much more nuanced than it appears, to the extent that a single all-encompassing definition may not exist. Thus, we employ a different strategy and aim to "sandwich" the concept of reconstruction attacks by addressing two complementing questions: (i) What conditions guarantee that a given system is protected against such attacks? (ii) Under what circumstances does a given attack clearly indicate that a system is not protected? More specifically, * We introduce a new definitional paradigm -- Narcissus Resiliency -- to formulate a security definition for protection against reconstruction attacks. This paradigm has a self-referential nature that enables it to circumvent shortcomings of previously studied notions of security. Furthermore, as a side-effect, we demonstrate that Narcissus resiliency captures as special cases multiple well-studied concepts including differential privacy and other security notions of one-way functions and encryption schemes. * We formulate a link between reconstruction attacks and Kolmogorov complexity. This allows us to put forward a criterion for evaluating when such attacks are convincingly successful. |
| title | Data Reconstruction: When You See It and When You Don't |
| topic | Cryptography and Security |
| url | https://arxiv.org/abs/2405.15753 |