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Mechanism Design for LLM Fine-tuning with Multiple Reward Models

Fuente: arXiv

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Bibliographic Details
Main Authors:	Sun, Haoran, Chen, Yurong, Wang, Siwei, Chu, Xu, Chen, Wei, Deng, Xiaotie
Format:	Preprint
Published:	2024
Subjects:	Computer Science and Game Theory
Online Access:	Acceder al recurso
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