Oblivious Monitoring for Discrete-Time STL via Fully Homomorphic Encryption

Fuente: arXiv
Saved in:
Bibliographic Details
Main Authors: Waga, Masaki, Matsuoka, Kotaro, Suwa, Takashi, Matsumoto, Naoki, Banno, Ryotaro, Bian, Song, Suenaga, Kohei
Format: Preprint
Published: 2024
Subjects:
Online Access:
Tags: Add Tag
No Tags, Be the first to tag this record!
_version_ 1866916443920007168
author Waga, Masaki
Matsuoka, Kotaro
Suwa, Takashi
Matsumoto, Naoki
Banno, Ryotaro
Bian, Song
Suenaga, Kohei
author_facet Waga, Masaki
Matsuoka, Kotaro
Suwa, Takashi
Matsumoto, Naoki
Banno, Ryotaro
Bian, Song
Suenaga, Kohei
contents When monitoring a cyber-physical system (CPS) from a remote server, keeping the monitored data secret is crucial, particularly when they contain sensitive information, e.g., biological or location data. Recently, Banno et al. (CAV'22) proposed a protocol for online LTL monitoring that keeps data concealed from the server using Fully Homomorphic Encryption (FHE). We build on this protocol to allow arithmetic operations over encrypted values, e.g., to compute a safety measurement combining distance, velocity, and so forth. Overall, our protocol enables oblivious online monitoring of discrete-time real-valued signals against signal temporal logic (STL) formulas. Our protocol combines two FHE schemes, CKKS and TFHE, leveraging their respective strengths. We employ CKKS to evaluate arithmetic predicates in STL formulas while utilizing TFHE to process them using a DFA derived from the STL formula. We conducted case studies on monitoring blood glucose levels and vehicles' behavior against the Responsibility-Sensitive Safety (RSS) rules. Our results suggest the practical relevance of our protocol.
format Preprint
id arxiv_https___arxiv_org_abs_2405_16767
institution arXiv
publishDate 2024
record_format arxiv
spellingShingle Oblivious Monitoring for Discrete-Time STL via Fully Homomorphic Encryption
Waga, Masaki
Matsuoka, Kotaro
Suwa, Takashi
Matsumoto, Naoki
Banno, Ryotaro
Bian, Song
Suenaga, Kohei
Cryptography and Security
Formal Languages and Automata Theory
When monitoring a cyber-physical system (CPS) from a remote server, keeping the monitored data secret is crucial, particularly when they contain sensitive information, e.g., biological or location data. Recently, Banno et al. (CAV'22) proposed a protocol for online LTL monitoring that keeps data concealed from the server using Fully Homomorphic Encryption (FHE). We build on this protocol to allow arithmetic operations over encrypted values, e.g., to compute a safety measurement combining distance, velocity, and so forth. Overall, our protocol enables oblivious online monitoring of discrete-time real-valued signals against signal temporal logic (STL) formulas. Our protocol combines two FHE schemes, CKKS and TFHE, leveraging their respective strengths. We employ CKKS to evaluate arithmetic predicates in STL formulas while utilizing TFHE to process them using a DFA derived from the STL formula. We conducted case studies on monitoring blood glucose levels and vehicles' behavior against the Responsibility-Sensitive Safety (RSS) rules. Our results suggest the practical relevance of our protocol.
title Oblivious Monitoring for Discrete-Time STL via Fully Homomorphic Encryption
topic Cryptography and Security
Formal Languages and Automata Theory
url https://arxiv.org/abs/2405.16767