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| Format: | Preprint |
| Veröffentlicht: |
2024
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| Online-Zugang: | https://arxiv.org/abs/2405.17987 |
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| _version_ | 1866914814729650176 |
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| author | Che, Xijia He, Yi Feng, Xuewei Sun, Kun Xu, Ke Li, Qi |
| author_facet | Che, Xijia He, Yi Feng, Xuewei Sun, Kun Xu, Ke Li, Qi |
| contents | Bluetooth Low Energy (BLE) is a short-range wireless communication technology for resource-constrained IoT devices. Unfortunately, BLE is vulnerable to session-based attacks, where previous packets construct exploitable conditions for subsequent packets to compromise connections. Defending against session-based attacks is challenging because each step in the attack sequence is legitimate when inspected individually. In this paper, we present BlueSWAT, a lightweight state-aware security framework for protecting BLE devices. To perform inspection on the session level rather than individual packets, BlueSWAT leverages a finite state machine (FSM) to monitor sequential actions of connections at runtime. Patterns of session-based attacks are modeled as malicious transition paths in the FSM. To overcome the heterogeneous IoT environment, we develop a lightweight eBPF framework to facilitate universal patch distribution across different BLE architectures and stacks, without requiring device reboot. We implement BlueSWAT on 5 real-world devices with different chips and stacks to demonstrate its cross-device adaptability. On our dataset with 101 real-world BLE vulnerabilities, BlueSWAT can mitigate 76.1% of session-based attacks, outperforming other defense frameworks. In our end-to-end application evaluation, BlueSWAT patches introduce an average of 0.073% memory overhead and negligible latency. |
| format | Preprint |
| id |
arxiv_https___arxiv_org_abs_2405_17987 |
| institution | arXiv |
| publishDate | 2024 |
| record_format | arxiv |
| spellingShingle | BlueSWAT: A Lightweight State-Aware Security Framework for Bluetooth Low Energy Che, Xijia He, Yi Feng, Xuewei Sun, Kun Xu, Ke Li, Qi Cryptography and Security Bluetooth Low Energy (BLE) is a short-range wireless communication technology for resource-constrained IoT devices. Unfortunately, BLE is vulnerable to session-based attacks, where previous packets construct exploitable conditions for subsequent packets to compromise connections. Defending against session-based attacks is challenging because each step in the attack sequence is legitimate when inspected individually. In this paper, we present BlueSWAT, a lightweight state-aware security framework for protecting BLE devices. To perform inspection on the session level rather than individual packets, BlueSWAT leverages a finite state machine (FSM) to monitor sequential actions of connections at runtime. Patterns of session-based attacks are modeled as malicious transition paths in the FSM. To overcome the heterogeneous IoT environment, we develop a lightweight eBPF framework to facilitate universal patch distribution across different BLE architectures and stacks, without requiring device reboot. We implement BlueSWAT on 5 real-world devices with different chips and stacks to demonstrate its cross-device adaptability. On our dataset with 101 real-world BLE vulnerabilities, BlueSWAT can mitigate 76.1% of session-based attacks, outperforming other defense frameworks. In our end-to-end application evaluation, BlueSWAT patches introduce an average of 0.073% memory overhead and negligible latency. |
| title | BlueSWAT: A Lightweight State-Aware Security Framework for Bluetooth Low Energy |
| topic | Cryptography and Security |
| url | https://arxiv.org/abs/2405.17987 |