Pessimism of the Will, Optimism of the Intellect: Fair Protocols with Malicious but Rational Agents
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arXiv
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| Main Authors: | , , , , |
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| Format: | Preprint |
| Published: |
2024
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| _version_ | 1866916462774452224 |
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| author | Brice, Léonard Raskin, Jean-François Sassolas, Mathieu Scerri, Guillaume Bogaard, Marie van den |
| author_facet | Brice, Léonard Raskin, Jean-François Sassolas, Mathieu Scerri, Guillaume Bogaard, Marie van den |
| contents | Fairness is a desirable and crucial property of many protocols that handle, for instance, exchanges of message.
It states that if at least one agent engaging in the protocol is honest, then either the protocol will unfold correctly and fulfill its intended goal for all participants, or it will fail for everyone.
In this work, we present a game-based framework for the study of fairness protocols, that does not define a priori an attacker model.
It is based on the notion of strong secure equilibria, and leverages the conceptual and algorithmic toolbox of game theory.
In the case of finite games, we provide decision procedures with tight complexity bounds for determining whether a protocol is immune to nefarious attacks from a coalition of participants, and whether such a protocol could exist based on the underlying graph structure and objectives. |
| format | Preprint |
| id |
arxiv_https___arxiv_org_abs_2405_18958 |
| institution | arXiv |
| publishDate | 2024 |
| record_format | arxiv |
| spellingShingle | Pessimism of the Will, Optimism of the Intellect: Fair Protocols with Malicious but Rational Agents Brice, Léonard Raskin, Jean-François Sassolas, Mathieu Scerri, Guillaume Bogaard, Marie van den Computer Science and Game Theory Computational Complexity Cryptography and Security Fairness is a desirable and crucial property of many protocols that handle, for instance, exchanges of message. It states that if at least one agent engaging in the protocol is honest, then either the protocol will unfold correctly and fulfill its intended goal for all participants, or it will fail for everyone. In this work, we present a game-based framework for the study of fairness protocols, that does not define a priori an attacker model. It is based on the notion of strong secure equilibria, and leverages the conceptual and algorithmic toolbox of game theory. In the case of finite games, we provide decision procedures with tight complexity bounds for determining whether a protocol is immune to nefarious attacks from a coalition of participants, and whether such a protocol could exist based on the underlying graph structure and objectives. |
| title | Pessimism of the Will, Optimism of the Intellect: Fair Protocols with Malicious but Rational Agents |
| topic | Computer Science and Game Theory Computational Complexity Cryptography and Security |
| url | https://arxiv.org/abs/2405.18958 |