Don't Get Hijacked: Prevalence, Mitigation, and Impact of Non-Secure DNS Dynamic Updates
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arXiv
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| Main Authors: | , , , , , |
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| Format: | Preprint |
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2024
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| _version_ | 1866914824420589568 |
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| author | Nosyk, Yevheniya Korczyński, Maciej Gañán, Carlos H. Król, Michał Lone, Qasim Duda, Andrzej |
| author_facet | Nosyk, Yevheniya Korczyński, Maciej Gañán, Carlos H. Król, Michał Lone, Qasim Duda, Andrzej |
| contents | DNS dynamic updates represent an inherently vulnerable mechanism deliberately granting the potential for any host to dynamically modify DNS zone files. Consequently, this feature exposes domains to various security risks such as domain hijacking, compromise of domain control validation, and man-in-the-middle attacks. Originally devised without the implementation of authentication mechanisms, non-secure DNS updates were widely adopted in DNS software, subsequently leaving domains susceptible to a novel form of attack termed zone poisoning. In order to gauge the extent of this issue, our analysis encompassed over 353 million domain names, revealing the presence of 381,965 domains that openly accepted unsolicited DNS updates. We then undertook a comprehensive three-phase campaign involving the notification of Computer Security Incident Response Teams (CSIRTs). Following extensive discussions spanning six months, we observed substantial remediation, with nearly 54\% of nameservers and 98% of vulnerable domains addressing the issue. This outcome serves as evidence that engaging with CSIRTs can prove to be an effective approach for reporting security vulnerabilities. Moreover, our notifications had a lasting impact, as evidenced by the sustained low prevalence of vulnerable domains. |
| format | Preprint |
| id |
arxiv_https___arxiv_org_abs_2405_19871 |
| institution | arXiv |
| publishDate | 2024 |
| record_format | arxiv |
| spellingShingle | Don't Get Hijacked: Prevalence, Mitigation, and Impact of Non-Secure DNS Dynamic Updates Nosyk, Yevheniya Korczyński, Maciej Gañán, Carlos H. Król, Michał Lone, Qasim Duda, Andrzej Cryptography and Security Networking and Internet Architecture DNS dynamic updates represent an inherently vulnerable mechanism deliberately granting the potential for any host to dynamically modify DNS zone files. Consequently, this feature exposes domains to various security risks such as domain hijacking, compromise of domain control validation, and man-in-the-middle attacks. Originally devised without the implementation of authentication mechanisms, non-secure DNS updates were widely adopted in DNS software, subsequently leaving domains susceptible to a novel form of attack termed zone poisoning. In order to gauge the extent of this issue, our analysis encompassed over 353 million domain names, revealing the presence of 381,965 domains that openly accepted unsolicited DNS updates. We then undertook a comprehensive three-phase campaign involving the notification of Computer Security Incident Response Teams (CSIRTs). Following extensive discussions spanning six months, we observed substantial remediation, with nearly 54\% of nameservers and 98% of vulnerable domains addressing the issue. This outcome serves as evidence that engaging with CSIRTs can prove to be an effective approach for reporting security vulnerabilities. Moreover, our notifications had a lasting impact, as evidenced by the sustained low prevalence of vulnerable domains. |
| title | Don't Get Hijacked: Prevalence, Mitigation, and Impact of Non-Secure DNS Dynamic Updates |
| topic | Cryptography and Security Networking and Internet Architecture |
| url | https://arxiv.org/abs/2405.19871 |