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Truthful Budget Aggregation: Beyond Moving-Phantom Mechanisms

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Bibliographic Details
Main Authors:	de Berg, Mark, Freeman, Rupert, Schmidt-Kraepelin, Ulrike, Utke, Markus
Format:	Preprint
Published:	2024
Subjects:	Computer Science and Game Theory
Online Access:	Acceder al recurso
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