Jailbreaking Large Language Models Against Moderation Guardrails via Cipher Characters

Fuente: arXiv
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Main Authors: Jin, Haibo, Zhou, Andy, Menke, Joe D., Wang, Haohan
Format: Preprint
Published: 2024
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author Jin, Haibo
Zhou, Andy
Menke, Joe D.
Wang, Haohan
author_facet Jin, Haibo
Zhou, Andy
Menke, Joe D.
Wang, Haohan
contents Large Language Models (LLMs) are typically harmless but remain vulnerable to carefully crafted prompts known as ``jailbreaks'', which can bypass protective measures and induce harmful behavior. Recent advancements in LLMs have incorporated moderation guardrails that can filter outputs, which trigger processing errors for certain malicious questions. Existing red-teaming benchmarks often neglect to include questions that trigger moderation guardrails, making it difficult to evaluate jailbreak effectiveness. To address this issue, we introduce JAMBench, a harmful behavior benchmark designed to trigger and evaluate moderation guardrails. JAMBench involves 160 manually crafted instructions covering four major risk categories at multiple severity levels. Furthermore, we propose a jailbreak method, JAM (Jailbreak Against Moderation), designed to attack moderation guardrails using jailbreak prefixes to bypass input-level filters and a fine-tuned shadow model functionally equivalent to the guardrail model to generate cipher characters to bypass output-level filters. Our extensive experiments on four LLMs demonstrate that JAM achieves higher jailbreak success ($\sim$ $\times$ 19.88) and lower filtered-out rates ($\sim$ $\times$ 1/6) than baselines.
format Preprint
id arxiv_https___arxiv_org_abs_2405_20413
institution arXiv
publishDate 2024
record_format arxiv
spellingShingle Jailbreaking Large Language Models Against Moderation Guardrails via Cipher Characters
Jin, Haibo
Zhou, Andy
Menke, Joe D.
Wang, Haohan
Cryptography and Security
Computation and Language
Computer Vision and Pattern Recognition
Machine Learning
Large Language Models (LLMs) are typically harmless but remain vulnerable to carefully crafted prompts known as ``jailbreaks'', which can bypass protective measures and induce harmful behavior. Recent advancements in LLMs have incorporated moderation guardrails that can filter outputs, which trigger processing errors for certain malicious questions. Existing red-teaming benchmarks often neglect to include questions that trigger moderation guardrails, making it difficult to evaluate jailbreak effectiveness. To address this issue, we introduce JAMBench, a harmful behavior benchmark designed to trigger and evaluate moderation guardrails. JAMBench involves 160 manually crafted instructions covering four major risk categories at multiple severity levels. Furthermore, we propose a jailbreak method, JAM (Jailbreak Against Moderation), designed to attack moderation guardrails using jailbreak prefixes to bypass input-level filters and a fine-tuned shadow model functionally equivalent to the guardrail model to generate cipher characters to bypass output-level filters. Our extensive experiments on four LLMs demonstrate that JAM achieves higher jailbreak success ($\sim$ $\times$ 19.88) and lower filtered-out rates ($\sim$ $\times$ 1/6) than baselines.
title Jailbreaking Large Language Models Against Moderation Guardrails via Cipher Characters
topic Cryptography and Security
Computation and Language
Computer Vision and Pattern Recognition
Machine Learning
url https://arxiv.org/abs/2405.20413