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Optimizing Contracts in Principal-Agent Team Production

Fuente: arXiv

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Détails bibliographiques
Auteur principal:	Zuo, Shiliang
Format:	Preprint
Publié:	2024
Sujets:	Computer Science and Game Theory
Accès en ligne:	Acceder al recurso
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