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| Main Authors: | , |
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| Format: | Preprint |
| Published: |
2024
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| Subjects: | |
| Online Access: | https://arxiv.org/abs/2406.00295 |
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Table of Contents:
- Boundedly Rational User Equilibria (BRUE) capture situations where all agents on a transportation network are electing the fastest option up to some time indifference, and serve as a relaxation of User Equilibria (UE), where each agent exactly minimizes their travel time. We study how the social cost under BRUE departs from that of UE in the context of static demand and stochastic costs, along with the implications of BRUE on the optimal signaling scheme of a benevolent central planner. We show that the average excess time is sublinear in the maximum time indifference of the agents, though such aggregate may hide disparity between populations and the sublinearity constant depends on the topology of the network. Regarding the design of public signals, even though in the limit where agents are totally indifferent, it is optimal to not reveal any information, there is in general no trend in how much information is optimally disclosed to agents. What is more, an increase in information disclosed may either harm or benefit agents as a whole.