Invisible Backdoor Attacks on Diffusion Models

Fuente: arXiv
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Main Authors: Li, Sen, Ma, Junchi, Cheng, Minhao
Format: Preprint
Published: 2024
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author Li, Sen
Ma, Junchi
Cheng, Minhao
author_facet Li, Sen
Ma, Junchi
Cheng, Minhao
contents In recent years, diffusion models have achieved remarkable success in the realm of high-quality image generation, garnering increased attention. This surge in interest is paralleled by a growing concern over the security threats associated with diffusion models, largely attributed to their susceptibility to malicious exploitation. Notably, recent research has brought to light the vulnerability of diffusion models to backdoor attacks, enabling the generation of specific target images through corresponding triggers. However, prevailing backdoor attack methods rely on manually crafted trigger generation functions, often manifesting as discernible patterns incorporated into input noise, thus rendering them susceptible to human detection. In this paper, we present an innovative and versatile optimization framework designed to acquire invisible triggers, enhancing the stealthiness and resilience of inserted backdoors. Our proposed framework is applicable to both unconditional and conditional diffusion models, and notably, we are the pioneers in demonstrating the backdooring of diffusion models within the context of text-guided image editing and inpainting pipelines. Moreover, we also show that the backdoors in the conditional generation can be directly applied to model watermarking for model ownership verification, which further boosts the significance of the proposed framework. Extensive experiments on various commonly used samplers and datasets verify the efficacy and stealthiness of the proposed framework. Our code is publicly available at https://github.com/invisibleTriggerDiffusion/invisible_triggers_for_diffusion.
format Preprint
id arxiv_https___arxiv_org_abs_2406_00816
institution arXiv
publishDate 2024
record_format arxiv
spellingShingle Invisible Backdoor Attacks on Diffusion Models
Li, Sen
Ma, Junchi
Cheng, Minhao
Machine Learning
Cryptography and Security
Computer Vision and Pattern Recognition
In recent years, diffusion models have achieved remarkable success in the realm of high-quality image generation, garnering increased attention. This surge in interest is paralleled by a growing concern over the security threats associated with diffusion models, largely attributed to their susceptibility to malicious exploitation. Notably, recent research has brought to light the vulnerability of diffusion models to backdoor attacks, enabling the generation of specific target images through corresponding triggers. However, prevailing backdoor attack methods rely on manually crafted trigger generation functions, often manifesting as discernible patterns incorporated into input noise, thus rendering them susceptible to human detection. In this paper, we present an innovative and versatile optimization framework designed to acquire invisible triggers, enhancing the stealthiness and resilience of inserted backdoors. Our proposed framework is applicable to both unconditional and conditional diffusion models, and notably, we are the pioneers in demonstrating the backdooring of diffusion models within the context of text-guided image editing and inpainting pipelines. Moreover, we also show that the backdoors in the conditional generation can be directly applied to model watermarking for model ownership verification, which further boosts the significance of the proposed framework. Extensive experiments on various commonly used samplers and datasets verify the efficacy and stealthiness of the proposed framework. Our code is publicly available at https://github.com/invisibleTriggerDiffusion/invisible_triggers_for_diffusion.
title Invisible Backdoor Attacks on Diffusion Models
topic Machine Learning
Cryptography and Security
Computer Vision and Pattern Recognition
url https://arxiv.org/abs/2406.00816