Beyond a binary theorizing of prosociality
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arXiv
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| Main Authors: | , , , , , , |
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| Format: | Preprint |
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2024
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| _version_ | 1866915041448558592 |
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| author | Shen, Chen He, Zhixue Guo, Hao Hu, Shuyue Tanimoto, Jun Shi, Lei Holme, Petter |
| author_facet | Shen, Chen He, Zhixue Guo, Hao Hu, Shuyue Tanimoto, Jun Shi, Lei Holme, Petter |
| contents | A stylized experiment, the public goods game, has taught us the peculiar reproducible fact that humans tend to contribute more to shared resources than expected from economically rational assumptions. There have been two competing explanations for this phenomenon: either contributing to the public good is an innate human trait (the prosocial preference hypothesis) or a transitory effect while learning the game (the confused learner hypothesis). We use large-scale experimental data from a novel experimental design to distinguish between these two hypotheses. By monitoring the effects of zealots (persistently cooperating bots) and varying the participants' awareness of them, we find a considerably more complex scenario than previously reported. People indeed have a prosocial bias, but not to the degree that they always forego taking action to increase their profit. While our findings end the simplistic theorizing of prosociality in the public goods game, an observed positive, cooperative response to zealots has actionable policy implications. |
| format | Preprint |
| id |
arxiv_https___arxiv_org_abs_2406_03796 |
| institution | arXiv |
| publishDate | 2024 |
| record_format | arxiv |
| spellingShingle | Beyond a binary theorizing of prosociality Shen, Chen He, Zhixue Guo, Hao Hu, Shuyue Tanimoto, Jun Shi, Lei Holme, Petter Physics and Society A stylized experiment, the public goods game, has taught us the peculiar reproducible fact that humans tend to contribute more to shared resources than expected from economically rational assumptions. There have been two competing explanations for this phenomenon: either contributing to the public good is an innate human trait (the prosocial preference hypothesis) or a transitory effect while learning the game (the confused learner hypothesis). We use large-scale experimental data from a novel experimental design to distinguish between these two hypotheses. By monitoring the effects of zealots (persistently cooperating bots) and varying the participants' awareness of them, we find a considerably more complex scenario than previously reported. People indeed have a prosocial bias, but not to the degree that they always forego taking action to increase their profit. While our findings end the simplistic theorizing of prosociality in the public goods game, an observed positive, cooperative response to zealots has actionable policy implications. |
| title | Beyond a binary theorizing of prosociality |
| topic | Physics and Society |
| url | https://arxiv.org/abs/2406.03796 |