Securing Equal Share: A Principled Approach for Learning Multiplayer Symmetric Games

Fuente: arXiv
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Hauptverfasser: Ge, Jiawei, Wang, Yuanhao, Li, Wenzhe, Jin, Chi
Format: Preprint
Veröffentlicht: 2024
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author Ge, Jiawei
Wang, Yuanhao
Li, Wenzhe
Jin, Chi
author_facet Ge, Jiawei
Wang, Yuanhao
Li, Wenzhe
Jin, Chi
contents This paper examines multiplayer symmetric constant-sum games with more than two players in a competitive setting, including examples like Mahjong, Poker, and various board and video games. In contrast to two-player zero-sum games, equilibria in multiplayer games are neither unique nor non-exploitable, failing to provide meaningful guarantees when competing against opponents who play different equilibria or non-equilibrium strategies. This gives rise to a series of long-lasting fundamental questions in multiplayer games regarding suitable objectives, solution concepts, and principled algorithms. This paper takes an initial step towards addressing these challenges by focusing on the natural objective of equal share -- securing an expected payoff of C/n in an n-player symmetric game with a total payoff of C. We rigorously identify the theoretical conditions under which achieving an equal share is tractable and design a series of efficient algorithms, inspired by no-regret learning, that provably attain approximate equal share across various settings. Furthermore, we provide complementary lower bounds that justify the sharpness of our theoretical results. Our experimental results highlight worst-case scenarios where meta-algorithms from prior state-of-the-art systems for multiplayer games fail to secure an equal share, while our algorithm succeeds, demonstrating the effectiveness of our approach.
format Preprint
id arxiv_https___arxiv_org_abs_2406_04201
institution arXiv
publishDate 2024
record_format arxiv
spellingShingle Securing Equal Share: A Principled Approach for Learning Multiplayer Symmetric Games
Ge, Jiawei
Wang, Yuanhao
Li, Wenzhe
Jin, Chi
Machine Learning
Multiagent Systems
Optimization and Control
This paper examines multiplayer symmetric constant-sum games with more than two players in a competitive setting, including examples like Mahjong, Poker, and various board and video games. In contrast to two-player zero-sum games, equilibria in multiplayer games are neither unique nor non-exploitable, failing to provide meaningful guarantees when competing against opponents who play different equilibria or non-equilibrium strategies. This gives rise to a series of long-lasting fundamental questions in multiplayer games regarding suitable objectives, solution concepts, and principled algorithms. This paper takes an initial step towards addressing these challenges by focusing on the natural objective of equal share -- securing an expected payoff of C/n in an n-player symmetric game with a total payoff of C. We rigorously identify the theoretical conditions under which achieving an equal share is tractable and design a series of efficient algorithms, inspired by no-regret learning, that provably attain approximate equal share across various settings. Furthermore, we provide complementary lower bounds that justify the sharpness of our theoretical results. Our experimental results highlight worst-case scenarios where meta-algorithms from prior state-of-the-art systems for multiplayer games fail to secure an equal share, while our algorithm succeeds, demonstrating the effectiveness of our approach.
title Securing Equal Share: A Principled Approach for Learning Multiplayer Symmetric Games
topic Machine Learning
Multiagent Systems
Optimization and Control
url https://arxiv.org/abs/2406.04201