Injecting Undetectable Backdoors in Obfuscated Neural Networks and Language Models

Fuente: arXiv
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Hauptverfasser: Kalavasis, Alkis, Karbasi, Amin, Oikonomou, Argyris, Sotiraki, Katerina, Velegkas, Grigoris, Zampetakis, Manolis
Format: Preprint
Veröffentlicht: 2024
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author Kalavasis, Alkis
Karbasi, Amin
Oikonomou, Argyris
Sotiraki, Katerina
Velegkas, Grigoris
Zampetakis, Manolis
author_facet Kalavasis, Alkis
Karbasi, Amin
Oikonomou, Argyris
Sotiraki, Katerina
Velegkas, Grigoris
Zampetakis, Manolis
contents As ML models become increasingly complex and integral to high-stakes domains such as finance and healthcare, they also become more susceptible to sophisticated adversarial attacks. We investigate the threat posed by undetectable backdoors, as defined in Goldwasser et al. (FOCS '22), in models developed by insidious external expert firms. When such backdoors exist, they allow the designer of the model to sell information on how to slightly perturb their input to change the outcome of the model. We develop a general strategy to plant backdoors to obfuscated neural networks, that satisfy the security properties of the celebrated notion of indistinguishability obfuscation. Applying obfuscation before releasing neural networks is a strategy that is well motivated to protect sensitive information of the external expert firm. Our method to plant backdoors ensures that even if the weights and architecture of the obfuscated model are accessible, the existence of the backdoor is still undetectable. Finally, we introduce the notion of undetectable backdoors to language models and extend our neural network backdoor attacks to such models based on the existence of steganographic functions.
format Preprint
id arxiv_https___arxiv_org_abs_2406_05660
institution arXiv
publishDate 2024
record_format arxiv
spellingShingle Injecting Undetectable Backdoors in Obfuscated Neural Networks and Language Models
Kalavasis, Alkis
Karbasi, Amin
Oikonomou, Argyris
Sotiraki, Katerina
Velegkas, Grigoris
Zampetakis, Manolis
Machine Learning
Cryptography and Security
As ML models become increasingly complex and integral to high-stakes domains such as finance and healthcare, they also become more susceptible to sophisticated adversarial attacks. We investigate the threat posed by undetectable backdoors, as defined in Goldwasser et al. (FOCS '22), in models developed by insidious external expert firms. When such backdoors exist, they allow the designer of the model to sell information on how to slightly perturb their input to change the outcome of the model. We develop a general strategy to plant backdoors to obfuscated neural networks, that satisfy the security properties of the celebrated notion of indistinguishability obfuscation. Applying obfuscation before releasing neural networks is a strategy that is well motivated to protect sensitive information of the external expert firm. Our method to plant backdoors ensures that even if the weights and architecture of the obfuscated model are accessible, the existence of the backdoor is still undetectable. Finally, we introduce the notion of undetectable backdoors to language models and extend our neural network backdoor attacks to such models based on the existence of steganographic functions.
title Injecting Undetectable Backdoors in Obfuscated Neural Networks and Language Models
topic Machine Learning
Cryptography and Security
url https://arxiv.org/abs/2406.05660