Are LLMs classical or nonmonotonic reasoners? Lessons from generics

Fuente: arXiv
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Autori principali: Leidinger, Alina, van Rooij, Robert, Shutova, Ekaterina
Natura: Preprint
Pubblicazione: 2024
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author Leidinger, Alina
van Rooij, Robert
Shutova, Ekaterina
author_facet Leidinger, Alina
van Rooij, Robert
Shutova, Ekaterina
contents Recent scholarship on reasoning in LLMs has supplied evidence of impressive performance and flexible adaptation to machine generated or human feedback. Nonmonotonic reasoning, crucial to human cognition for navigating the real world, remains a challenging, yet understudied task. In this work, we study nonmonotonic reasoning capabilities of seven state-of-the-art LLMs in one abstract and one commonsense reasoning task featuring generics, such as 'Birds fly', and exceptions, 'Penguins don't fly' (see Fig. 1). While LLMs exhibit reasoning patterns in accordance with human nonmonotonic reasoning abilities, they fail to maintain stable beliefs on truth conditions of generics at the addition of supporting examples ('Owls fly') or unrelated information ('Lions have manes'). Our findings highlight pitfalls in attributing human reasoning behaviours to LLMs, as well as assessing general capabilities, while consistent reasoning remains elusive.
format Preprint
id arxiv_https___arxiv_org_abs_2406_06590
institution arXiv
publishDate 2024
record_format arxiv
spellingShingle Are LLMs classical or nonmonotonic reasoners? Lessons from generics
Leidinger, Alina
van Rooij, Robert
Shutova, Ekaterina
Computation and Language
Artificial Intelligence
Recent scholarship on reasoning in LLMs has supplied evidence of impressive performance and flexible adaptation to machine generated or human feedback. Nonmonotonic reasoning, crucial to human cognition for navigating the real world, remains a challenging, yet understudied task. In this work, we study nonmonotonic reasoning capabilities of seven state-of-the-art LLMs in one abstract and one commonsense reasoning task featuring generics, such as 'Birds fly', and exceptions, 'Penguins don't fly' (see Fig. 1). While LLMs exhibit reasoning patterns in accordance with human nonmonotonic reasoning abilities, they fail to maintain stable beliefs on truth conditions of generics at the addition of supporting examples ('Owls fly') or unrelated information ('Lions have manes'). Our findings highlight pitfalls in attributing human reasoning behaviours to LLMs, as well as assessing general capabilities, while consistent reasoning remains elusive.
title Are LLMs classical or nonmonotonic reasoners? Lessons from generics
topic Computation and Language
Artificial Intelligence
url https://arxiv.org/abs/2406.06590